Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System by Schmitz, Amy J.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-15-2012
Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky
Wheel System
Amy J. Schmitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amy J. Schmitz Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System , 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012 3:16 PM 
 
279 
Access to Consumer Remedies in the 
Squeaky Wheel System 
Amy J. Schmitz* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
II.   CONVERGING FORCES FAVORING SQUEAKY WHEELS 
A.   Companies’ Impetus to Grease the Wheels 
1.   Prevailing Reasons for Appeasing Complainers 
2.   Tempered Reluctance to Relinquish Power 
B.   Factors Impacting Consumer Complaints 
1.   Inertia, Over-Optimism, and Rule-Following 
Tendencies 
2.   Resource and Patience Limitations 
3.   Socialization and Biases 
4.   My Survey Findings Regarding Contract Irrelevance 
III.   CONSEQUENCES OF THE SWS IN THE CONSUMER CONTEXT 
A.   Silenced “Informed Minority” 
B.   Contractual Discrimination 
C.   Under-Enforcement of Consumer Protections and Stifled 
Public Voice 
IV.   NEW AVENUES FOR INFORMATION AND REMEDIES 
A.   Utility of Online Communications in the Digital Age 
1.   Reservations Regarding Use of CMC 
2.   Overriding Benefits of CMC for Accessing Remedies 
B.   Suggestions for Expanding and Equalizing Consumer 
Assistance 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
 *   Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.  I 
thank Michael A. Helfand, David Horton, Nancy Kim, and Mark Lowenstein for their comments, 
and Jeffrey Boman, Caitlin McHugh, Deborah Moguillansky, Heather Park, Holly Andersen, and 
Katherine Nelson for their research assistance. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:16 PM 
 
280 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most have heard the adage: “The squeaky wheel gets the grease.”  This 
refers to the notion that the “squeaky wheels”—who are proactive in 
pursuing their needs and complaints—are most likely to get the assistance, 
remedies, and other benefits they seek.  However, those who remain silent 
usually do not learn about or receive the same benefits.  Furthermore, the 
individuals with the requisite resources to pursue their interests are often 
those who already enjoy disproportionate power due to social or economic 
status.1  This dynamic—which this Article will refer to as the “squeaky 
wheel system” (SWS)—dominates the workplace and marketplace.2 
The SWS thrives in debt, insurance, and other business-to-consumer 
(B2C) contexts.  Although creditors are notoriously squeaky wheels in 
pursuing payment from debtors, debtors also must become squeaky wheels 
to obtain fee waivers and interest rate deductions that lenders reserve for 
only the most high-value and persistent customers.3  Furthermore, 
individuals must be persistent to obtain compensation on insurance claims 
due to insurers’ “rationing by hassle” through delay-and-ignore tactics.4  In 
addition, merchants may ration remedies and cut costs by using the SWS to 
limit remedies for purchase complaints.5  They know that relatively few 
consumers are aware of available remedies, and even fewer seek assistance.6  
 
 1.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 2.  Of course, “squeaky wheel” is not my term, and others have referred to the general dynamic 
in the workplace as the “squeaky wheel system.”  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 132–35 (2000).  However, this system is rarely 
discussed in consumer contexts, and I am using SWS for ease of reference. 
 3.  See Unique Envelope Corp. v. GS Am., Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 643, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(noting a debtor’s testimony regarding the need to pay “the next squeaky wheel” creditor); Eide v. 
Nat’l City Capital Corp. (In re Riversideworld, Inc.), 366 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007) 
(discussing the debtor in financial trouble paying only the squeaky wheels); Matthew T. Smith, 
Being the Squeaky Wheel: A Proactive Approach to Representing Creditors in Chapter 11 
Litigation, in CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11 CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE 
REORGANIZATION PROCESS, EXERCISING CREDITORS’ RIGHTS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT 
OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 109–29 (Aspatore 2009) (highlighting the importance of “being the 
squeaky wheel” in the bankruptcy process as a means for getting paid on debts). 
 4.  See Richard Lewis, Property Insurance 101, in INSURANCE LAW 2006: UNDERSTANDING 
THE ABC’S, at 61, 100 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 741, 2006) (noting 
the need to be a “squeaky wheel” in order to get paid on insurance claims due to insurance 
companies’ “rationing by hassle”). 
 5.  See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A 
Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
701, 702 (1977) (noting that sellers choose to use “less stringent quality control practices” and 
simply compensate those that complain about defective products). 
 6.  Id. at 711–12 (finding that only 39.7% of consumers who experience purchase problems 
complain to the company, report it to a third party, or take any sort of action). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:16 PM 
[Vol. 39: 279, 2012] Squeaky Wheel System 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
281 
Furthermore, out of the consumers who take any action, only a very small 
handful have the requisite confidence and resources to become squeaky 
wheels who capture businesses’ attention and obtain remedies.7 
Through this SWS rationing, businesses may maximize their profits 
while eluding legitimate complaints and perpetuating a system of status-
based treatment.8  They may control public information by quieting the 
squeaky wheel consumers and perhaps hiding health and safety information 
regarding their products.9  Companies also may use the SWS to capitalize on 
continued freedom to impose fees and one-sided contract terms on the 
consumer masses that remain uninformed about their rights or the 
availability of benefits.10  The SWS can effectively prevent the minority of 
informed consumers from spreading information to others about products 
and other purchase problems.11 
This means that economists’ proposed “informed minority” fails to 
police the fairness of contract terms and business practices.12  Economists 
posit that regardless of whether most consumers ignore contract terms, a 
minority of consumers will police fairness for the good of all consumers by 
notifying others of unfair practices and threatening to go elsewhere if 
companies do not make appropriate changes.13  This theory, however, is 
based on questionable assumptions and unfounded facts.14 
 
 7.  See infra Part II.B.  Admittedly, it is unclear how persistent a consumer must be to become a 
squeaky wheel who is likely to obtain what he seeks.  This will depend on company policies and 
norms in a given context.  Nonetheless, the squeaky wheels discussed in this Article are generally 
individuals who are proactive in asserting their needs and who will persist in seeking assistance 
despite an initial denial. 
 8.  See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an 
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672–76 (1996) 
(discussing how sellers differentiate among buyers by providing contract changes and adjustments to 
only the most sophisticated consumers who complain). 
 9.  See Trouble with Recalls, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2011, at 14 (highlighting 2010 survey 
findings indicating that “[o]nly a fifth of U.S. adults were aware of having purchased food, 
medication, or a product (other than a car) that was recalled in the past three years,” and the reasons 
for this lack of information). 
 10.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674–75 (noting that with respect to latent defects not 
covered by pro-seller warranty terms, sellers often provide repairs for complaining customers to stop 
them from creating “bad will for sellers,” while they continue to deny such repairs for the 
“uninformed masses who simply bear the loss”). 
 11.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 12.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 647–50 (explaining and questioning the informed 
minority argument); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of 
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 714–16 (1992) (explaining 
the informed minority argument through a discussion of the “marginal set of informed consumers”). 
 13.  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637–39 (1979) (“Thus, if 
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As an initial matter, there is no evidence that a sufficient number of 
“informed” consumers read or shop for purchase terms beyond price and a 
few other provisions particular to their needs.15  Furthermore, even if some 
level of informed minority exists, only a handful of the consumers in this 
group pursue contract complaints.16  In addition, the members of the 
informed minority who obtain assistance through their persistence have little 
to no incentive to share information about rationed benefits with the 
uninformed masses who subsidize the SWS through their inaction.17  
Businesses know they generally can quiet the informed squeaky wheels by 
giving them “special” assistance and emphasizing the businesses’ inability to 
provide everyone with these benefits.18  This, in turn, perpetuates the SWS 
and businesses’ manipulation of contract terms and dispute resolution.19 
These SWS dynamics highlight the importance of what I have termed 
the consumer “contracting culture.”20  This conception of culture goes 
beyond common notions of culture based on ethnicity, and encompasses 
broad contextual economic and non-economic factors that affect parties’ 
bargaining powers and contracting behaviors.21  For example, the B2C 
contracting culture is generally more “extra-communal” than business-to-
business (B2B) contexts because consumers usually do not share bargaining 
 
enough searchers exist, firms have incentives both to compete for their business and to offer the 
same terms to nonsearchers.  When the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the 
preferences of nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend to protect all 
consumers.”). 
 14.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 664–76 (concluding that the informed minority argument 
is based on faulty assumptions). 
 15.  See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1–26 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 (studying the Internet 
browsing of 45,091 households and finding that only one or two in 1000 shoppers studied online 
software merchants or accessed their websites).  Even proactive shoppers usually focus on only price 
and a few other terms particular to their needs.  LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT 
THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND INTERPRETATION 28–30 (2007). 
 16.  See infra Part III.A. 
 17.  See infra notes 247–56 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 879, 895–97 (2008) (discussing how businesses may discriminate in favor of sophisticated 
consumers by reducing fees and foregoing enforcement of terms in their form agreements that are 
otherwise “prejudicial to customer interests”). 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration 
Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123 (2007). 
 21.  See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
511 (2009) (tracing ways to use culture as means for infusing law into societal consciousness); John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 
(1991) (discussing the application of social science and empirical research in the law); Jeffrey Z. 
Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 
249, 250–53 (1991) (highlighting the importance of cultural differences relating to ethnicity or 
nationality, and recognizing similar differences due to race, gender, and age). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:16 PM 
[Vol. 39: 279, 2012] Squeaky Wheel System 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
283 
power, experience, and understandings with businesses that draft form 
contracts.22  In contrast, parties to more “intra-communal” B2B transactions 
often share relatively equal bargaining power and contract experience.23 
The SWS is less problematic in “intra” versus “extra” communal 
contexts because parties in intra-communal transactions usually have less 
ability to control the SWS to ration information and remedies.  For example, 
contractors and subcontractors in B2B construction transactions usually 
understand their rights at the outset because they use accepted industry 
contracts.24  In addition, trade organizations provide strong means and 
incentives for sharing information, thereby creating an informed majority to 
help police the fairness of business practices.25  This largely alleviates the 
need for public regulations to address the problematic effects of the SWS in 
these intra-communal—as opposed to extra-communal—contexts. 
In contrast, the lack of shared contract understandings and power fuels 
the force of the SWS in B2C exchanges.26  This system allows businesses to 
ration remedies and discriminate in favor of sophisticated squeaky wheel 
consumers with the requisite information and resources to protect their 
interests and pursue purchase complaints.27  All consumers then shoulder the 
passed-on costs of appeasing these squeaky wheels, regardless of whether 
their complaints are legitimate.28  Furthermore, the consumers with the least 
power and resources withstand the worst of these costs and rarely know 
about, let alone enjoy, the rationed benefits.29  In summary, this creates a 
need for consumer protections that the broken market has failed to provide.30 
This Article uncovers the salience of the SWS in B2C exchanges, and 
explores its impacts on contract regulation and purchase practices in the 
consumer marketplace.  Part II discusses companies’ impetus to appease 
squeaky wheels, as well as the behavioral, practical, and social factors that 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 20, at 123–35 (explaining my contracting culture spectrum 
analysis). 
 23.  See id. at 158 (describing the commercial construction context as an example of intra-
communal B2B transactions). 
 24.  See, e.g., id. at 156–57 (noting that the Associated General Contractors of America’s Short 
Form is a “typical standard form construction contract”). 
 25.  See, e.g., id. at 155–58 (discussing use by a prominent trade organization, the American 
Institute for Architects (AIA), of form contracts requiring dispute resolution that allows parties to 
manage their reputations and resolve disputes). 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
 27.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra notes 247–56 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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affect consumers’ likelihood and ability to pursue complaints and remedies.  
It also provides a snapshot of empirical data from my e-survey of Colorado 
consumers that is relevant to SWS dynamics.  Part III then discusses 
consequences of the SWS with respect to B2C practices, leading to Part IV’s 
proposal for proportional and efficient means for consumers to access 
purchase information and contract remedies.  Part V concludes with a call 
for further development of such remedy mechanisms aimed to diffuse the 
SWS, narrow the divide between the consumer “haves” and “have-nots,” 
and foster better regulation of the fairness of companies’ contract and claims 
assistance practices. 
II.  CONVERGING FORCES FAVORING SQUEAKY WHEELS 
We learn from an early age that it is wise to be persistent in a world 
where “sometimes only ‘the squeaky wheel gets the grease.’”31  For the most 
part, this fosters efficient allocation of assets to those who value them most 
and appropriately rewards individuals for expending resources to pursue 
their needs.32  Nonetheless, companies’ profit incentives and consumers’ 
behavioral tendencies often converge to allow the SWS to curb consumer 
rights and foster favoritism for those with the most resources and power.33 
A.  Companies’ Impetus to Grease the Wheels 
Dominant forces push companies to change contract terms ex ante, and 
to provide purchase remedies ex post to only the squeaky wheels or to those 
who ask for assistance or complain the loudest.34  Furthermore, companies 
with tight budgets in this tough economy may ration their assistance to the 
consumers who have the requisite resources to make more and larger 
purchases to the disadvantage of those with the least resources.  These 
business propensities then converge with individual behavioral tendencies 
and biases to foster companies’ manipulations of the SWS and widen the 
divide between the informed minority and uninformed majority of 
consumers.35 
 
 31.  ROBERTO ARON ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS § 34.24 (2d ed. 1996).  See also 
Marsh Buggies, Inc. v. Weems Geophysical, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-2767, 1999 WL 638592, at *2 
(E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1999) (“[T]he notion that the squeaky wheel gets the oil is as applicable at the 
end of the twentieth century as it was at the end of the nineteenth.”). 
 32.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 673–75 (discussing benefits received by customers who 
are invested and informed). 
 33.  See infra Parts II.A–II.B.3. 
 34.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674 (discussing companies changing contract terms for 
well-informed and outspoken customers). 
 35.  See id. at 674–75. 
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1.  Prevailing Reasons for Appeasing Complainers 
The SWS has become familiar in the workplace, especially in           
low- information environments in which employees “in the know” reap all 
the available benefits.36  For example, some law faculties operate on a SWS 
to the extent that school deans ration special research and travel funding to 
only those who are aware of, and therefore become persistent in seeking, 
such benefits.37  Furthermore, risk-averse employees generally lose out in 
the SWS because they fear repercussions of asking for benefits or 
complaining about work conditions.38  They may remain quiet due to fear 
that asking would appear greedy or uncooperative, which could jeopardize 
their jobs and reputations.39  Companies also may foster this dynamic by 
strategically informing favored or “insider” employees regarding available 
benefits to the detriment of those who lack this inside information.40 
Such SWS dynamics are also alive and well in the low-information 
environment of B2C exchanges.  Merchants generally assist and focus their 
attention on only those consumers that proactively pursue their complaints 
and contract needs.41  They may “grease” the squeaky wheel consumers to 
retain them as customers and prevent them from informing other consumers 
about purchase problems.42  Furthermore, sellers know that consumers will 
complain to them before bringing their complaints to third parties such as 
the Better Business Bureau (BBB) or the courts, and therefore may use the 
SWS to monopolize complaint resolution to their benefit.43  This allows 
businesses to avoid providing redress or making consumer-friendly contract 
 
 36.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 132–35 (explaining the “squeaky wheel system” in 
the employment context in particular). 
 37.  Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings and Open 
Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 676–77 (2006) (highlighting how this can harm women in seeking 
paid family leave). 
 38.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 132–35.  Workers may be especially risk-averse in 
this poor economy due to fear of lay-offs. 
 39.  See id. at 132. 
 40.  Id. at 133.  See also Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 149, 213–15 (2005) (discussing how “management greases the squeaky wheel” in the 
workplace, and explaining how this can promote positive feedback gathering initiatives where 
employers encourage constructive criticism); Kessler, supra note 37. 
 41.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674–75. 
 42.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 701, 727 (noting study findings showing that satisfaction 
rates for complaint resolution for frequently purchased products were higher than those for 
infrequently purchased goods, although rates for products generally were higher than those for 
services). 
 43.  Id. at 713–15 (highlighting how few consumers bring complaints to third parties such as the 
BBB or the courts, and companies’ “monopoly on complaint handling”). 
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or policy changes with respect to the masses who fail to voice their 
complaints.44  In this way, businesses may manage their reputations, ration 
benefits, limit liability, and boost profits.45 
Businesses understand that most consumers do not exert the time and 
energy necessary to pursue their purchase complaints.  Research indicates 
that only 20.1% of frequently purchased products and 20.9% of services 
generate formal consumer complaints, but that this is only the “tip-of-the-
iceberg” to the extent that many consumers, especially those of lower 
socioeconomic status, do not realize their rights to complain.46  Furthermore, 
“buyers suppress complaints concerning about two-thirds of the problems 
they perceive,” and a very small percentage of the one-third that take any 
action persistently assert their complaints or report them to third parties.47  
Businesses therefore may ration remedies by assisting only the few 
persistent complainers.48 
At the same time, businesses focus on persistent customers in order to 
get the “most bang for their buck.”49  Businesses get more mileage out of 
“wowing” current customers by providing special assistance or making 
exceptions, than expending resources to attract new customers.50  It is 
roughly five times harder to attract new customers than to retain current 
ones, and businesses “can increase profits by 25 to 85 percent merely by 
retaining 5 percent more of [their] current customers.”51  Studies also show 
that customers who obtain satisfactory resolution of their complaints are 
more loyal to a business than customers who never experience disputes.52 
Furthermore, appeased complainers are more apt than others to 
recommend a business to friends and family.53  However, customers who are 
not satisfied with resolution of their complaints are likely to both leave and 
denounce that business.  One complaining consumer is likely to share his or 
 
 44.  Id. at 716–20. 
 45.  Id. at 721–22. 
 46.  Id. at 701–08 (reporting study results and highlighting significant differences in problem 
perception rates based on socioeconomic status and race). 
 47.  Id. at 709–12, 727–30 (providing study results regarding consumers’ responses to perceived 
problems by purchase categories). 
 48.  Id. at 702–03. 
 49.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674–75 (noting that sellers will address complainers’ 
concerns out of fear that the complainers will create bad will for them). 
 50.  WOLF J. RINKE, DON’T OIL THE SQUEAKY WHEEL: AND 19 OTHER CONTRARIAN WAYS TO 
IMPROVE YOUR LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS 133–38 (2004) (discussing the importance of the 
“wow” factor in providing customer assistance, even if it comes only in the wake of complaints). 
 51.  Id. (providing business leadership advice). 
 52.  Lenden Webb, Brainstorming Meets Online Dispute Resolution, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
337, 357–58 (2004) (citing studies).  See also Tibbett L. Speer, They Complain Because They Care, 
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1996, at 13 (discussing how “grousers are likely to remain loyal” and 
recommend a retailer to others if the retailer is attentive to their complaints). 
 53.  See RINKE, supra note 50, at 136–38; Speer, supra note 52, at 13. 
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her negative experiences with roughly twenty-one others.54  Moreover, the 
Internet allows unhappy customers to tell scores of others about their 
experiences by posting negative comments on blogs and online social 
networking websites.55  From this perspective, “the squeaky wheel is worth a 
lot of grease.”56 
2.  Tempered Reluctance to Relinquish Power 
Dominant forces push companies to grease squeaky wheels who are 
persistent in pursuing their purchase complaints.57  That said, businesses 
have become less generous in heeding consumers’ requests for changes to 
B2C form terms, and many companies include unilateral amendment 
provisions in their form contracts that hinder consumers’ incentive to shop 
for or negotiate form contracts.58  Consumers understandably see no reason 
to negotiate terms ex ante knowing that companies can change the terms ex 
post.59  Furthermore, companies’ use of “shrouding” (through mass mailings 
or confusing online presentations) to slip provisions into form contracts 
further hinders consumers from noticing, let alone negotiating around, 
onerous provisions.60 
Consumers therefore voice powerlessness against merchants’ form 
contracts.  For example, the consumers who participated in the focus groups 
I held in Denver complained about their lack of power in consumer 
purchases and their general distrust of merchants.61  Participants in the 
groups also felt they had no choice but to accept form terms despite an 
 
 54.  See RINKE, supra note 50, at 138. 
 55.  See JANELLE BARLOW & CLAUS MOLLET, A COMPLAINT IS A GIFT 202–16 (2008) (noting 
how customers now may post negative comments on the Internet to reach global audiences); PETE 
BLACKSHAW, SATISFIED CUSTOMERS TELL THREE FRIENDS, ANGRY CUSTOMERS TELL 3,000, at 1–
10 (2008) (noting how an upset customer posted his recording of his negative experience seeking to 
cancel AOL service on the Internet, thereby spreading his complaint to at least 62,827 others). 
 56.  Webb, supra note 52, at 357–58. 
 57.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 58.  See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 478–79 (2009) (highlighting how drafters have incentives to adhere to 
form contract terms). 
 59.  See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding a unilateral change 
provision in a cellular phone contract unenforceable); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract 
Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 648–52 (2010) (explaining the 
inefficiency and anti-bargaining effects of unilateral amendment provisions). 
 60.  See Horton, supra note 59, at 649–57. 
 61.  See Transcript, Consumer Focus Group in Denver, Colorado (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished 
transcript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Focus Group Transcript].  Over the course of two days 
in November 2006, I held three focus group discussions in Denver regarding contracting issues. 
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ostensible freedom to “shop around.”62  One consumer lamented how she 
felt trapped to accept a disclaimer of liability her dentist gave her 
immediately before undergoing a major dental procedure.63  Other 
consumers also recounted instances in which representatives told them that 
form terms were not subject to any alteration, or salespersons said that they 
lacked power to change company terms.64 
Many companies also have become stingier in providing ex post 
purchase remedies to those that complain.  One study found that only 56.5% 
of consumers who voiced non-price complaints regarding their purchases 
were satisfied with their complaints’ resolutions.65  Companies may ignore 
consumers with legitimate complaints, and brush aside those customers they 
view as less powerful or desirable.  Some suggest that companies also have 
cut back on customer assistance to help weather the economic downturn.66 
It is nonetheless unwise to simply focus on squeaky wheels.67  One 
business leadership manual entitled Don’t Oil the Squeaky Wheel warns that 
employers may waste time and money seeking to appease whiners, while 
neglecting the truly valuable, but quiet, employees.68  Similarly, businesses 
busy placating complainers may assume erroneously that non-complainers 
are content and will remain loyal customers.  Studies suggest that only 4% 
of unhappy customers provide feedback directly to the company, while 96% 
of these customers silently take their business elsewhere.69  “Voting with the 
feet is the American way.”70  Unhappy customers also typically tell eight to 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. (further explaining that her uncle had recommended the dentist to her, which helped her 
trust his competence). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 726–27. 
 66.  See Alana Semuels, Credit or Debit, Human?; Robots and Other Machines Are Increasingly 
Edging Out People for Jobs in the Retail Sector, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at A1 (discussing 
companies’ use of automated systems instead of personal service); Businesses Balance Customer 
Service With Job Cuts, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=102492766 (noting how companies seeking to cut costs in this tough 
economy have curbed customer service staff). 
 67.  See Testa v. Town of Madison, No. Civ.04-185-B-W, 2005 WL 2365319, at *17 (D. Me. 
Sept. 26, 2005), aff’d, Civ.04-185-B-W, 2005 WL 2864785 (D. Me. Nov. 1, 2005) (rejecting an 
employee’s claim that she was a protected whistleblower simply because she was “a squeaky wheel 
[who] is supposed to get the grease”); Charles A. Edwards & Lovic A. Brooks, III, The “Squeaky 
Wheel” Employee: To Grease or to Replace and the Costs of Each, 32 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1981) 
(discussing employees’ uses of squeaky wheel tactics to harass management). 
 68.  RINKE, supra note 50, at 107–14 (focusing on pitfalls of appeasing “whiners,” while 
neglecting the highest performing employees and saddling the diligent, but quiet, workers with extra 
burdens from accommodating the whiners who may never be satisfied). 
 69.  See Jerry Plymire, Complaints as Opportunities, 5 J. SERVICES MARKETING 61 (1991) 
(discussing a study conducted by T.A.R.P., a customer service research firm, and explaining why 
customers rarely provide feedback directly to companies). 
 70.  Id. at 63 (further explaining how and why companies should encourage complaints to assist 
them in improving their practices and growing their customer bases). 
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ten others about their negative experiences even if they had never voiced 
their concerns to the company directly.71 
Merchants also may be reluctant to grease overly squeaky wheels who 
excessively return or exchange purchased items.72  Some merchants 
therefore oust, instead of grease, these customers by barring future returns.73  
This is wise to the extent it combats improper consumer practices such as 
return fraud, which cost retailers an estimated $9.6 billion in 2009 alone.74  
Companies seeking to establish enforcement of their form contracts also 
may be reluctant to heed consumer complaints for fear they will waive 
future insistence on those terms.75 
Some consumers complain, however, that this perpetuates high-pressure 
sales and punishes consumers for helping to expose merchants’ improper 
practices.76  In addition, some businesses have transformed reluctance to 
assist complaining consumers into a delay-and-hassle tactic for containing 
costs and boosting profits.77  As mentioned above, some insurance 
companies “ration by hassle” to limit their payments on insurance claims.78  
For example, some insurance companies have used “sweeping denials” and 
 
 71.  Id. at 61–65.  Other sources indicate that unhappy customers share their complaints with 
eight to sixteen others.  Janis Dietz, Keep the ‘Silent Majority’ Mum, MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 27, 
1997, at 20 (highlighting the “silent majority” of dissatisfied customers that complain to friends but 
not to the company directly). 
 72.  See RICHARD K. MILLER & KELLI WASHINGTON, CONSUMER MARKETING 160–62 (2009) 
(discussing how companies ban known “wardrobers” who buy products such as dresses for fancy 
parties or televisions for the Super Bowl); Ariana Eunjung Cha, Some Shoppers Find Fewer Happy 
Returns, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30908-
2004Nov6 (noting the use of electronic monitoring to track excessive returns). 
 73.  See, e.g., Cha, supra note 72 (explaining that due to excessive returns customers are 
sometimes declined when they try to return items). 
 74.  See Press Release, National Retail Federation, Retailers Find Balance as Return Policies 
Assist Honest Shoppers, Fight Fraud (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.nrf.com/ 
modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id=814. 
 75.  See Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Omega Tool Corp. (In re Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc.), 
344 B.R. 394, 406 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding company could not rely on payment terms in the 
applicable contract because they were not followed in the industry). 
 76.  See, e.g., Stan Sutter, Editorial, When a Customer Is Wrong, MARKETING MAG., July 28, 
2003, at 22 (commenting on the battle two sisters had with Filene’s Basement after they were 
banned for excessive returns). 
 77.  See, e.g., infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 78.  See Lewis, supra note 4; see also supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (recounting 
consumer stories). 
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“mad dog defense tactics” following catastrophes to limit liability and 
prolong interest accruals on amounts owed to policyholders.79 
Lastly, even companies that are usually reluctant to assist consumers are 
prone to assist the squeakiest wheels—often out of fear that these consumers 
will bring claims or share negative stories with others.80  Moreover, these 
business practices converge with individuals’ behavioral tendencies and 
biases to allow companies to manipulate the SWS to their advantage.81  It 
also works to advantage the most powerful and desirable consumers, thereby 
fostering contractual discrimination and widening the gap between the 
consumer “haves” and “have-nots.”82 
B.  Factors Impacting Consumer Complaints 
Most consumers have purchase complaints that they never assert against 
a company,83 especially when the consumers rely on the company for its 
services.84  The data supports theories suggesting that behavioral tendencies, 
socialization, and limited resources often work together to hinder 
consumers’ pursuit of complaints.85  Furthermore, empirical data from my 
e-survey confirms that consumers lack information regarding their rights, 
generally fail to protect their contract needs, and are relatively disinterested 
in non-price contract terms.86 
 
 79.  See Kelsey D. Dulin, The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ Post-
Catastrophe Claims Handling Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 196–201 (2008) (highlighting these 
tactics and insurance companies’ use of delay policies to capitalize on the time-value of money). 
 80.  See Dietz, supra note 71, at 20 (highlighting the importance of appeasing complainers); 
Speer, supra note 52, at 13 (noting how complaining customers are those most likely to remain loyal 
and recommend a business to others if it satisfies the complaints). 
 81.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 672–76. 
 82.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730. 
 83.  See id. at 701 (noting how the complaints individuals voice are only the “tip-of-the-iceberg” 
and “represent only a fraction of the problems they perceive concerning those purchases”). 
 84.  See Colette Thayer & Gerard Rainville, Consumer Financial Protection: Opinion of People 
Aged 50+: State Surveys, AM. ASS’N RETIRED PEOPLE (AARP) (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-04-2010/finprotect_states.html (reporting results of 
studies in Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, South Dakota, and Wisconsin of individuals over fifty years old 
regarding the need for reforms and consumer protections in the areas of investing, banking, and 
lending).  Recent surveys of individuals over fifty indicated overwhelming support for reforms and 
protections with respect to investment firms, banks and lending practices.  However, the surveys 
used leading questions.  For example, one question asked whether investment companies should be 
required to disclose information “using plain language and a user-friendly format.”  Colette Thayer 
& Chuck Rainville, Consumer Financial Protection: Opinion of People Aged 50+ in Arkansas, AM. 
ASS’N RETIRED PEOPLE (AARP) (Apr. 2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/ 
finprotect_ar.pdf. 
 85.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 710–15 (finding that only 39.7% of the consumers in 
one study reported taking some kind of action with respect to purchase problems, and only 30.7% of 
that group said they voiced their complaints to a seller). 
 86.  See infra text accompanying notes 206–07. 
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1.  Inertia, Over-Optimism, and Rule-Following Tendencies 
Behavioral and cognitive theorists have illuminated individuals’ 
propensities to improperly assess the importance of purchases and contract 
terms.87  Most individuals lack the knowledge structures to understand and 
digest the often long and complex form contracts that have become common 
in the consumer marketplace.88  Individuals also may be overly optimistic 
about their contracts and fail to foresee potential problems, which may help 
explain why so many consumers fall prey to high costs and adjustable rate 
mortgages.89  Similarly, individuals may make economically inefficient or 
unwise contract choices due to the sunk-cost effect, cognitive dissonance, 
confirmation bias, and low-ball techniques.90 
As Professor Russell Korobkin has proposed, individuals often suffer 
from contracting inertia to the extent they accept preprinted terms, even if 
the terms defy industry practice or legal defaults.91  They also may skim 
contracts merely to confirm assumptions or salespersons’ promises, and 
readily accept sales representatives’ explanations regardless of their 
plausibility.92  Consumers invest in their purchasing decisions and seek 
 
 87.  See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 307–22 (discussing cognitive biases); Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 
1204–06, 1222–25, 1243–44 (2003) (discussing law and economics’ assumptions regarding 
consumer rationality and proposing that “buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational 
decision makers,” and therefore market forces often will lead to inefficient terms in sellers’ form 
contracts). 
 88.  See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological 
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 98–99 (2010). 
 89.  See id. at 100–01; see also Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard 
Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122–24 (2007) (explaining behavioral law and economics 
basics); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological 
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1607–09, 1627 (1998) (noting 
individuals’ “tunnel vision” skewed by their biases).  But see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559–75 (1998) (critiquing behavioral 
law and economics as merely a psychological and sociological account of human behavior that 
“confuse[s] explanation and prediction” and lacks “theoretical ambition”). 
 90.  Full discussion of these psychological and behavioral patterns is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but I invite you to see Becher, supra note 89, at 124–35 for further explanation of these 
various patterns. 
 91.  See Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1586 (advancing the “inertia theory” that parties prefer 
default contract provisions). 
 92.  See Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in 
Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987). 
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confirmations that their decisions are sound.93  This, along with low 
expectations regarding their purchases, may help explain study results 
indicating that many consumers fail to perceive problems with their 
purchases.94  Individuals’ rationality is therefore “bounded” to the extent that 
they do not properly assess contract provisions or take initiative to protect 
their long-term economic interests.95 
Many individuals also feel morally obligated to follow through and 
comply with the contracts they sign, even when contract terms defy fairness 
norms.96  Despite contract law’s economic elements, behavioral and 
psychological theories, as well as empirical evidence, suggest that 
individuals believe there is a moral element to contract performance.97  
Contracting parties form a “psychological contract” to the extent that they 
become sensitive to breaches as influencing their interpersonal trust and 
cooperation.98 
Although this sense of duty to follow contracts is most prevalent in 
intra-communal exchanges, it also can be true in B2C contexts.99  
Consumers may feel obligated to abide by form contract terms regardless of 
whether they understood and consciously agreed to the terms ex ante.  
Therefore, they may assume they have no recourse on their complaints based 
on remedy limitations that they were unaware of at the time of purchase.  
Consumers also may feel ashamed that they made purchases or agreed to 
services without reading the contracts.  Most consumers who first read their 
 
 93.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 101–04 (discussing various biases and cognitive 
tendencies that contribute to these effects). 
 94.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 703–10 (reporting findings on problem perception rates 
and articulating possible responses to perceived purchase problems). 
 95.  Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476–81, 1545–47 (1998) (also indicating hope that economists and lawyers would 
incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions).  But see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal 
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72–74, 125–32 (2002) (critiquing the behavioral law and economics 
view as based on only limited empirical research and failing to precisely apply data to account for 
variations among decision-makers). 
 96.  See Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Law of Contract, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 43 
(1965) (discussing roles of morality in contract law); Andrew Phang, Positivism in the English Law 
of Contract, 55 MOD. L. REV. 102 (1992) (also noting moral aspects of contract law). 
 97.  See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach?  A Psychological 
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 638–49 (2010) (discussing the moral impetus to follow through 
with contract terms). 
 98.  Id. at 640–42 (emphasizing how people believe that breach is morally problematic and that 
resistance to breach is a kind of “moral heuristic”).  See also Barbara Mescher, Business Ethics and 
the Law of Contract, 8 J.L. & FIN. MGMT. 8, 11 (2009) (highlighting moral impulses to comply with 
contract promises).  But see Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing Obligation and the Psychological 
Contract: A Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137 (1994) (explaining psychological contracts 
in employment relationships and how employees’ perceived obligations to their employers decrease 
over time). 
 99.  See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 97, at 639–40. 
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contracts and learn of remedy limitations when problems transpire “will 
lament their bad luck and foolishness for not checking earlier.”100 
Consumers also are usually inert both pre- and post-contract and are 
unlikely to seek contract changes or assert their complaints because they 
assume they have no choice but to accept and abide by form terms.101  This 
is especially true when consumers would have to return products or give up 
services to pursue their complaints.102  Furthermore, although some 
consumers voice their complaints, most are unlikely to expend the necessary 
time and other resources, especially if they are embarrassed by an unwise 
purchasing decision.103 
2.  Resource and Patience Limitations 
A lack of resources often fuels and coincides with behavioral tendencies 
in hindering consumers from seeking remedies regarding their purchase 
problems.104  Individuals’ tendencies to remain inert escalate with the time 
and resources necessary for proactive contracting and seeking redress.105  
Consumers busy with work and family obligations usually ignore fine print 
in standard contracts and may pay bills automatically without reviewing 
invoices for unexpected charges.  For example, most consumers pay for 
telephone services without noticing relatively small charges tacked on to 
their bills each month by third-party “crammers” who make millions of 
dollars from adding charges for fax, Internet, and other services without 
customers’ express authorization.106 
 
 100.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674; see also id. at 675–76 (explaining the various 
arguments). 
 101.  See Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: 
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 212–17 
(2010) (analyzing consumer responses to form contracts both pre- and post-contract, and noting how 
consumers assume that standard form terms are binding). 
 102.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 715 (observing that greater consumer inconvenience 
reduces the probability that consumers will voice their complaints about a product or service). 
 103.  See id. at 717–19 (demonstrating that consumers are more likely to complain about objective 
defects in a product than subjective dissatisfaction). 
 104.  Id. at 711–13 (discussing study findings regarding consumer complaints). 
 105.  Id. at 714–16 (emphasizing how the difficulty of asserting rights affects complaint rates). 
 106.  See Beat the New ‘Cramming’ Scams, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 2010, at 13 (“‘Crammers 
make a lot of money because only half of all consumers ever catch the small charges and 
complain.’”). 
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Furthermore, consumers are likely to give up in pursuing complaints 
when companies ignore their initial requests for assistance.107  Anger may 
lead a consumer to take the time to send an e-mail or letter regarding 
unexpected or unfair contract terms or charges.  However, most consumers 
are likely to capitulate after receiving no response or blanket refusal to 
provide redress.108  This is particularly true where the contested charges or 
expenses are relatively small.109 
Indeed, it often is not worth it from a consumer’s perspective to expend 
time and resources pursuing a relatively small claim.110  For example, one 
law student reported how he was subjected to a $9.99 fee for “daily 
horoscope texts” on his cellular phone bill after applying for what appeared 
to be a scholarship.111  This student never ordered any horoscopes and did 
not see the extra charges until he got his bill at the end of the month.112  
Although this determined law student chose to contest the charge, he 
lamented his frustration with spending more than the $9.99 in his time and 
resources in the battle.113  He concluded that most consumers do not detect 
or contest the charges, especially with automatic payment of bills through 
banks and credit cards.114 
Companies also may hinder consumers’ pursuit of claims by making it 
very unpleasant or stressful for consumers to seek redress.  For example, one 
consumer reported that after he submitted his information to receive a “free” 
credit report from www.freecreditreport.com, he began noticing charges on 
 
 107.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 715 (noting that increasing complexity in the 
consumer complaint process is related to the likelihood that a consumer will voice their complaint). 
 108.  See id. 
 109.  Id. at 711–17 (reporting findings indicating that the cost of a product or service and the way 
problems are dealt with weigh heavily in determining complaint rates). 
 110.  See id. 
 111.  E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to author 
(May 31, 2010, 23:10 MST) (on file with author) (documenting his experience with a scholarship 
application that required him to provide his basic information, including his cellular phone number, 
and which resulted in $9.99 of charges on his phone bill for horoscopes he never ordered). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id.; E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to 
author (June 1, 2010, 10:12 MST) (on file with author). 
 114.  Id.  The consumer I interviewed also noted how the company sent this scholarship 
application to a university e-mail list, and simply asked for name, address, and cellular phone 
number.  Id.  Furthermore, the charges suddenly appeared on a regular phone bill with a major 
carrier and were ostensibly pursuant to hidden terms in the application.  Id.  See also E-mail from 
Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to author (June 1, 2010, 10:24 
MST) (on file with author) (answering questions the author asked about the charges, and 
highlighting how most students would not notice or contest such charges in a seemingly legitimate 
scholarship application); E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law 
School, to author (Nov. 28, 2011, 2:22 MST) (on file with author) (confirming interview remarks). 
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his credit card.115  When he called the customer service representative to 
complain, the representative insisted that his submission for a free report 
required him to sign up for a paid subscription for credit monitoring.116  The 
representative also made it nearly impossible for the consumer to cancel the 
subscription by ensnarling him in a lengthy “tug-of-war.”117  Ultimately, the 
very persistent consumer cancelled the subscription and further charges, but 
he remained liable for the initial subscription charge, which he begrudgingly 
paid to avoid any more hassle.118 
Similarly, a “[w]eb-savvy personal finance editor” reported how she had 
to endure a long battle with her credit card company in seeking to reverse 
charges for “free trial” offers for facial products.119  After she signed up for 
the “free trial” and received the initial products, she properly cancelled as 
required to escape charges.120  However, the product sellers billed her for 
over $200.121  She spent significant time making multiple calls and sending 
letters to the sellers and her credit card company before she eventually 
cleared her account.122  Ultimately, she concluded: “Was it worth it?  Of 
course not.  Worse, I think the whole ordeal gave me a new wrinkle.”123 
It is true that some consumers may broadcast negative information about 
companies’ practices through blogs or social networking websites.124  
However, consumers already exhausted from unsuccessfully seeking 
 
 115.  Memorandum from Nathan Vassar, Graduate, University of Texas School of Law, to author 
(Apr. 26, 2010) (on file with author) (documenting his experience with 
http://www.freecreditreport.com). 
 116.  Id.  A very astute law professor relayed a similar story.  He and his wife were each being 
charged a $15 monthly fee after innocently checking their credit reports through the same site.        
E-mail from David Horton, Assoc. Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, to author (Sept. 3, 
2010, 16:46 MST) (on file with author).  They had no notice of the charge and faced fierce resistance 
when they tried to cancel the imposed subscription.  Id. 
 117.  See Memorandum from Nathan E. Vasser to author, supra note 115. 
 118.  Id.  The consumer concluded: “I ended up hassled and frustrated by the entire experience, as 
I had to pay for one month’s subscription, and endured a lengthy and difficult phone conversation in 
order to release myself from the automatic monthly charge.”  Id. 
 119.  Julie Sherrier, How I Won My Wrinkle Cream Face-Off, TAKING CHARGE: A 
CREDITCARDS.COM BLOG (Oct. 14, 2009), http://blogs.creditcards.com/2009/10/got-the-free-trial-
offer-blues.php. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id.; see also David Segal, A Guide to Complaints That Get Results, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2010), http://nytimes.com/2010/05/23/your-money/23haggler.html (regular column, The 
Haggler, that chronicles consumers’ submitted stories of complaints and how they did or did not get 
remedies). 
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assistance are unlikely to invest additional time or energy posting their 
grievances.  Furthermore, consumers may not realize that their contracts 
defy legal regulations or standards.125  Companies perpetuate this lack of 
information by burying terms in confusing fine print and managing publicity 
by quietly appeasing the few sophisticated consumers who complain. 
3.  Socialization and Biases 
Socialization and biases texture the meaning of the objective 
“reasonable person” that contract law often assumes with respect to 
economic transactions.126  Research indicates that despite legal assumptions, 
social stereotypes influence consumers’ negotiations and propensities to 
assert their rights.127  As an initial matter, American culture generally frowns 
on complainers and calls on consumers to maintain a “[s]tiff upper lip.”128  
Stereotypes and socialization also guide when we speak, what we say, and 
how others perceive our communications.129  For example, employees may 
use speaking opportunities at work to signal certain characteristics such as 
strength or intelligence, while employers may screen employees’ statements 
to assess whether an employee possesses characteristics the employer 
values.130 
With respect to gender, society teaches women from an early age to be 
relational and cooperative, and to display more interest in fostering 
relationships than pursuing economic goals.131  This may lead women to be 
constrained by a “psychological straitjacket” that hinders them from 
complaining, asking for what they need, or otherwise asserting 
themselves.132  Research generally indicates that women often achieve less 
 
 125.  See Marco B.M. Loos, Individual Private Enforcement of Consumer Rights in Civil Courts 
in Europe 5–7 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Contract Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010/01), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535819 (noting how a lack of information about enforcement 
rights and options may squelch consumers’ enforcement of their rights). 
 126.  Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable Person in Context, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1285, 1285–89, 1310–11 (2010). 
 127.  Id. at 1286–90 (discussing behavioral and psychological research indicating how stereotypes 
influence contracting). 
 128.  Plymire, supra note 69, at 61–62 (noting cultural propensities). 
 129.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 107–10, 113–15, 133–35 (discussing how fear of 
stereotypes may impact employees’ propensities to make requests at work). 
 130.  Id. at 107–10 (using this scenario). 
 131.  Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Difference in Negotiation Outcome: A 
Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653, 653–58 (1999) (highlighting research suggesting  that 
women are more cooperative and relationship-focused in negotiations, but noting that it is unclear 
whether this affects negotiation outcomes). 
 132.  See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT (2008) (suggesting strategies to help 
women better evaluate their worth and assert themselves in ways that comport with their 
personalities); Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation 
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 302 (1999) (discussing gender in negotiations); Laurie 
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favorable outcomes in negotiations because they feel less entitled to ask for 
what they want.133  One study indicated that men pursue negotiations to 
further their own interests about four times more often than women do.134  
Survey results also suggest that women are much less likely than men to 
recognize opportunities to negotiate.135 
Women also tend to express self-doubt and use equivocal language in 
negotiations, while men display more confidence and initiative in asserting 
their rights.136  Women fearful of appearing “pushy” may refrain from 
asserting their rights.137  Of course, this is not true for all women, and some 
research indicates no significant difference between men and women with 
respect to complaint frequency.138  Nonetheless, the data overall suggests 
that women ask for assistance or complain less often than men do.139 
Similarly, research shows that race significantly affects problem 
perception and reporting rates within the same socioeconomic groups.140  In 
one study, black consumers were much less likely than white consumers to 
perceive purchase problems or to complain regarding products and services 
of the same quality, thereby indicating that black consumers had lower 
expectations.141  Accordingly, the black and white consumers’ relatively 
equal reported purchase satisfaction rates did not necessarily indicate that 
 
A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of 
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 629–31 
(1998) (explaining socialized behavioral differences between men and women, and expectations that 
women should be more “community oriented” and less proactive in protecting their own economic 
interests). 
 133.  See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 1–4 (addressing the “voice” inside many 
women’s heads telling them they should be happy with what they have and not greedily ask for 
more); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral 
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 116–20, 125–26 (2008) (discussing 
research regarding gender in negotiations). 
 134.  BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 4. 
 135.  Id. at 41 (noting how women were 45% more likely to score low on a rating scale assessing 
whether people saw their situations as open to change via negotiations). 
 136.  Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 653–77 (reviewing findings from studies on 
gender in negotiations). 
 137.  See also infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that women often 
do not “get the grease” in contract negotiations or the workplace). 
 138.  Bård Tronvoll, Complainer Characteristics When Exit is Closed, 18 INT’L J. SERVICE 
INDUSTRY MGMT. 25, 33–35 (2007) (noting research regarding gender). 
 139.  See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that women ask for 
things less frequently than men). 
 140.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 707, 723–24 (reporting study findings). 
 141.  See id. at 723–24. 
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the consumers received equal treatment.142  Instead, the evidence overall 
suggested that black consumers generally did not receive the same purchase 
benefits because they did not know they deserved or could get these 
benefits.143 
Stereotypes and biases also may affect how company representatives 
and customer service agents react to consumers who complain or ask for 
assistance.  For example, company representatives may have preconceived 
biases based on gender that affect their behaviors.144  Representatives may 
view female consumers as “bitchy” if they complain, or weak and easily 
brushed aside if they are not assertive.145  In one study, researchers coached 
male and female actors to remain “cooperative and pleasantly assertive” 
while working with test groups.146  Afterwards, group participants described 
the men as having “more ability, skill, and intelligence,” but saw the women 
behaving in the same manner as “emotional, bossy, and domineering.”147  
The participants nonetheless denied having any sex biases when asked 
directly about their attitudes.148 
Studies similarly suggest that individuals often deny that they are biased 
but nonetheless harbor subconscious negative associations with members of 
minority groups.149  This may cause company representatives to respond 
negatively or offer lesser deals to minority consumers.  For example, 
Professor Ayres found in his study of Chicago car sales that white women 
had to pay 40% higher prices than white men did, and black consumers had 
to pay over twice the markup paid by all other customers, regardless of 
market competition that should have eliminated such discrimination.150  
Surprisingly, this was true although the car dealerships steered the tester-
 
 142.  See id. at 707, 727. 
 143.  Id. at 727. 
 144.  See infra text accompanying notes 145–59. 
 145.  See Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete 
Ceilings in Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 68–69 (2004) (“Women quite rightfully 
worry about being labeled ‘the Bitch’ if they become the squeaky wheel about compensation or if 
they ‘grand stand’ about their accomplishments.”). 
 146.  BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 61. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id.  See also Wendy Reiboldt, Factors That Influence a Consumer Complainer’s Rating of 
Service Received from a Third Party Complaint-Handling Agency—The Los Angeles Department of 
Consumer Affairs, 16 J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION AND COMPLAINING 
BEHAVIOR 166, 166–67, 171–74 (2003) (reporting survey results regarding complaint handling by an 
agency in California and finding that race, income, gender, and other similar factors impacted rating 
of service). 
 149.  See Ellen Waldman, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: The Right Stuff?, 10 NEV. L.J. 513, 
526 (2010) (highlighting prejudice at the unconscious level). 
 150.  Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 817, 819, 822–43 (1991) (noting others’ animus-based theories of discrimination and 
providing further detail regarding the research methodology and findings). 
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buyers to salespersons who shared the buyers’ gender and race 
characteristics.151 
Research in lending contexts also indicates that company representatives 
provide the best deals to white male consumers.152  Evidence suggests that 
men obtain more attractive mortgages than women do, and lenders steer 
minorities and women toward subprime and less desirable loans although 
they could qualify for prime mortgages.153  The National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition found in a 2003 field test that lenders treated black 
testers, especially black female testers, less favorably than white testers even 
though the black testers had better credit profiles.154  Similarly, a 2006 
Consumer Federation of American study concluded that lenders were five 
times more likely to saddle upper-income black women than upper-income 
white men with a subprime mortgage.155 
Contractual discrimination was likely at the core of the dealings at issue 
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.156  In that case, the furniture 
seller imposed an onerous cross-collateralization term on consumers in poor 
minority neighborhoods, assuming consumers in such neighborhoods 
present higher credit risks.157  Ms. Williams was an African-American 
woman with limited income, and was not a sophisticated consumer to the 
extent that she did not detect the onerous cross-collateralization provision in 
her purchase contract.158  Unlike most consumers in her position, however, 
she chose to “speak up” and bring a lawsuit that is now famous for 
presenting a “paradigmatic example of an unfair bargain.”159 
 
 151.  White men were offered the best deals from white female sellers; white women received the 
best prices from black salesmen; black males received the best deals from white saleswomen; and 
black females received the best prices from white men.  Id. at 840–42.  But see Best & Andreasen, 
supra note 5, at 727 (finding no statistically significant correlation between socioeconomic status 
and satisfactory resolution of consumer complaints, but noting that this is subject to data that those 
of lower status are less likely to perceive or raise complaints). 
 152.  Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 653–77. 
 153.  See Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay Advocating Self-
Regulation of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REV. 1217, 1217–22 (2010) (compiling and 
citing research regarding discriminatory lending).  The research has left many asking “[w]hy would 
people who could qualify for prime mortgage loans end up with subprime loans?”  Id. at 1217. 
 154.  See id. at 1219–20 (discussing the study and findings). 
 155.  Id. at 1221. 
 156.  350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 157.  See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 205–06, 237–40 (discussing discrimination in the 
Williams case). 
 158.  See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 897–99 (discussing the case). 
 159.  DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 203–04. 
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Companies continually tailor their B2C practices based on “worthiness” 
predictions.160  Companies gather information about consumers through 
online registrations and by tracking consumers’ buying practices to target 
consumers who frequently make high-value purchases, and to avoid or drop 
consumers who lack resources for high expenditures.161  Companies also 
may discriminate against these “low-value, low-sophistication consumers” 
who lack resources by ignoring their needs while attending to “high-value, 
high-information consumers” that are proactive in seeking contract changes 
and benefits.162  A company may provide these “sophisticated” high-value 
consumers with waivers, exemptions, and other benefits in hopes of growing 
its revenues by gaining their loyalty and hindering them from spreading 
negative company reviews.163 
Overall, these studies suggest that white men, especially those who 
companies consider “high-value,” have a significant advantage in the 
SWS.164  They are more likely than other consumers, especially women and 
black men, to get what they want.165  This leaves the majority of consumers 
to bear costs associated with providing benefits to the high-value squeaky 
wheels.  Although power and context may discount some study results, the 
evidence is nonetheless troubling and highlights the need for further research 
regarding contract bias.166 
4.  My Survey Findings Regarding Contract Irrelevance 
Along with the above factors, findings from my own survey research 
help provide contextual background for exploring the SWS.  Survey research 
is subject to perception and reporting biases, and individuals’ propensities to 
 
 160.  See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 161.  See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 375, 384 (discussing transaction-based versus debt-based credit card issuers, and 
explaining how transaction-based issuers seek to maximize the number of cardholders who make 
frequent high-value purchases). 
 162.  See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 900–02 (explaining this argument). 
 163.  Id.  Nonetheless, some credit card companies may prefer customers they expect to be less 
informed or vigilant in their contracting, such as young and low-income consumers with little credit 
history or contracting experience.  See id.  These consumers are prone to unknowingly pay extra 
charges without complaint.  Id. (depicting how issuers make their money from late fees and interest 
instead of interchange fees); Karin Braunsberger et al., The Effectiveness of Credit-Card Regulation 
for Vulnerable Consumers, 18 J. SERVICES MARKETING 358, 358–70 (reporting credit card 
companies’ direct mail solicitations to college students and low-income populations in hopes of 
attracting new customers with limited credit card experience). 
 164.  See supra text accompanying notes 144–63. 
 165.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 656–74 (noting mixed studies but highlighting 
cause for concern as it relates to workplace negotiations). 
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report fiscally and socially responsible behavior.167  Nonetheless, it sheds 
light on what consumers care about and how they behave in making 
purchases and dealing with purchase problems.  Although my survey asked 
many questions about consumers’ contracting behaviors and perceptions, 
this Article focuses on questions pertaining to consumers’ actions and 
understandings related to seeking contract changes and remedies. 
I administered a survey of Colorado consumers that produced a sample 
of 306 completed surveys, with roughly one-third male respondents and two-
thirds female respondents.168  About half of these respondents were married, 
7.5% lived with domestic partners, and the remaining respondents were 
single, separated, or widowed.169  The sample identified as three-quarters 
Caucasian or white, and reported varying levels of education; 43% had a 
Bachelor’s or post-graduate degree, 44% completed some college but had no 
degree, and the rest had a high school diploma or less.170  Forty-two percent 
reported full-time employment, 16% reported part-time jobs, and the rest 
reported no employment outside the home.171 
As an initial matter, the survey responses revealed general skepticism 
regarding remedies for purchase claims.  When asked to assess perceived 
fairness of dispute or settlement agreements, 32.7% replied “completely” or 
“usually” fair, 44.6% were “neutral,” and the remainder said “usually” or 
 
 167.  See Thea F van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias in Self-Report 
Research, 25 AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NURSING 40 (2008) (discussing “social desirability bias” which 
leads survey respondents to present a favorable image of themselves and answer questions in ways 
that conform with social values and norms). 
 168.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey Data and Notes (2007 to present) (unpublished 
survey) (on file with author) [hereinafter Survey Notes].  I worked with the Institute for Behavioral 
Science (IBS) at the University of Colorado and Survey Sampling International (SSI) in order to 
ensure confidentiality and to receive full approval by the Human Research Council at the University 
of Colorado.  The survey was sent to roughly 10,000 Colorado residents over the age of eighteen in 
SSI’s research panel in October and November of 2007 in order to ultimately produce a sample of 
306 properly completed surveys.  Prior to that time, we had dropped from our sample any partial 
responses or responses that were otherwise faulty due to skipped questions, “flat-lined” responses, 
and other indications that the respondent “cheated” in some way.  Through our attempts to gather 
more male responses, we learned that women are much more receptive to answering online surveys. 
 169.  See infra app. A, at p. 334. 
 170.  See infra app. A, at pp. 334–36.  The sample identified as 74.5% white, 14.7% did not 
specify race or ethnicity, and the remainder identified as black, Hispanic, Asian, Indian, Pacific 
Islander, or multiple races.  See infra app. A, at p. 336. 
 171.  See infra app. A, at p. 334.  Many did not identify themselves with respect to occupation.  Of 
the 82% of those that reported income, roughly 30% stated under $29,999, 30% stated $30,000–
$49,000, 19% stated $50,000–$74,999, 9.6% stated $75,000–$99,999, and 11.2% reported over 
$100,000.  See infra app. A, at p. 333. 
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“completely” unfair.172  Respondents nonetheless replied “usually” or 
“completely” fair at much higher rates regarding nearly all of the other types 
of contracts listed in the same question.  This included warranties (62%), car 
sales (57.4%), employment terms (68.5%), and companies’ standard form 
contracts (57.9%).173  Only gym memberships generated more negative 
responses, with 31% reporting “completely” or “usually” unfair.174 
The survey also asked consumers to check all the terms, if any, they 
“found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute” 
about a purchase.175  This was followed by a list of terms, including those for 
price, warranties, fees and other penalties, returning items, cancelling 
services, “freebies” or incentives, other and “N/A; I have never had a claim 
or dispute.”176  Overall, respondents did not report “yes” for many terms to 
indicate that they were important in dealing with purchase complaints.177  
Nonetheless, they indicated importance at the greatest percentages with 
respect to terms covering warranties (56.9%), returns (50%), and cancelling 
services (46.7%).178 
Furthermore, response data confirmed research and theory suggesting 
that education influences consumer complaints.  There was a significant 
positive association between education level and likelihood to notice 
anything about arbitration in consumer purchase terms.179  In addition, there 
was a statistically significant positive association between education level 
and the likelihood to find warranty terms important regarding consumer 
complaints, suggesting that those with more education were more likely to 
 
 172.  See infra app. B, at p. 343.  The survey asked consumers to “think broadly about how fair 
(using [their] own sense of ‘fairness’) [they] view different contracts and purchase terms, regardless 
of whether [they] have relevant personal experiences.”  See infra app. B, at p. 337. 
 173.  See infra app. B, at pp. 337–43. 
 174.  See infra app. B, at p. 337.  The percentages reporting “usually” or “completely” fair with 
respect to the remaining contracts listed were as follows: loan contracts 52.5%, apartment leases 
51.3%, credit card terms 39.1%, Internet purchase terms 44.6%, cell phone contracts 37.2%, 
contracts with friends 40%, and contracts with family 41.2%.  See infra app. B, at pp. 337–43. 
 175.  See infra app. C, at p. 343. 
 176.  See Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. III, question 6. 
 177.  See infra app. C, at p. 343. 
 178.  See infra app. C, at p. 343.  With respect to the other terms, respondents answered “yes” to 
importance in percentages as follows: price (19.9%), fees/penalties (37.3%), interest rate/credit 
payment (21.6%), freebies/incentives (8.8%), and disclaimers/waivers (17.6%).  See infra app. C, at 
p. 343. 
 179.  This question asked generally whether respondents had “seen or noticed anything about 
‘arbitration’” in any of their consumer purchase terms.  See infra app. M, at p. 363.  We used 
Kendall’s tau to assess association between noticing arbitration terms (dichotomous variable) and 
education levels ranging from some college, college degree, some postgraduate, to 
master’s/Ph.D./etc. (ordinal variable).  The association was significant at .154.  See Amy J. Schmitz, 
Consumer Survey Data Analysis Backup (2007 to present) (unpublished memos and notes with 
statistical accounting) (on file with author and Pepperdine Law Review) [hereinafter Analysis 
Backup]. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:16 PM 
[Vol. 39: 279, 2012] Squeaky Wheel System 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
303 
empower themselves in consulting warranty terms to address purchase 
problems.180  There also was a significant, but weak, negative association 
between education level and the likelihood to mark “never had a dispute.”181  
This comports with other research indicating that consumers with less 
education are less likely to perceive purchase problems or assert their 
complaints.182 
Survey findings also confirmed consumers’ inertia and general failure to 
take initiative in negotiating contract terms when making consumer 
purchases.  Thirty-eight percent of respondents reported “never” and 27.4% 
stated “rarely” when asked how often they “try to negotiate or change” form 
contracts or terms in making consumer purchases.183  Only 8.6% said that 
they “frequently” or “nearly all the time” seek such purchase term 
changes.184  Furthermore, 71.3% of female respondents, as compared with 
53.4% of male respondents, reported that they “never” or “rarely” try to 
negotiate form terms, which comports with other research suggesting that 
women are less assertive in pursuing their contract interests.185 
Out of the 182 respondents who reported trying to change contract 
terms, 42.9% said that they “never” or “rarely” succeed in getting merchants 
to change their terms.186  Furthermore, only 15.9% of the 182, or 29 of the 
306 total survey sample, reported that they were successful “frequently” or 
“nearly all the time” in changing contract terms.187  In addition, respondents 
indicated very little success in changing particular terms, with the highest for 
price at 36.3%.188  The percentages for changing other listed terms were as 
 
 180.  We again used Kendall’s tau to assess association between education level and noting 
warranty terms as important with respect to a complaint in Part III, Question 6.  The association was 
significant at .038, but the level of association was quite low at only .11—with zero being no 
association and 1 or -1 being perfect association.  See Analysis Backup, supra note 179. 
 181.  See id. 
 182.  See id.  Using Kendall’s tau, we found a correlation that was significant at .019.  This 
provided some evidence that those with less education were more likely to say they never had a 
contract dispute.  Id. 
 183.  See infra app. D, at p. 346.  Analysis is focused on “valid percent” (percent of those who 
answered the question) to account for “missing data” (i.e., those who did not answer that question).  
See Analysis Backup, supra note 179; Harvard-MIT Data Center’s Guide to SPSS, 
http://hmdc.harvard.edu/projects/SPSS_Tutorial/spsstut.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2011). 
 184.  See infra app. D, at p. 346. 
 185.  See infra app. E, at p. 346. 
 186.  See infra app. F, at p. 347. 
 187.  See infra app. F, at p. 347.  This was a mere 9.4% of the 306 total respondents.  See infra 
app. F, at p. 347. 
 188.  See infra app. G, at p. 347.  The survey question asked: “What types of terms have you been 
able to get changed in form contracts?  Check all that apply.”  See infra app. G, at p. 347. 
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follows: warranties (13.4%), fees (19.9%), interest rates for credit payment 
(15%), returns (13.1%), cancelling service (10.5%), arbitration (2.3%), 
incentives (11.8%), and disclaimers/waivers of liability (5.6%).189 
This lack of success in negotiating contract changes impacts contract 
expectations.  When asked their level of agreement with various statements 
regarding form purchase terms, 66.2% of respondents said they “strongly 
agree” or “somewhat agree” that they “assume [they] cannot get a seller to 
change form terms.”190  Nonetheless, most of the respondents indicated 
awareness that it is prudent to read form terms.191  A total of 71.1% of 
respondents indicated that they “somewhat disagree” or “strongly disagree” 
that “it is a waste of time to read form terms.”192  Similarly, 74.4% reported 
that they “somewhat disagree” or “strongly disagree” that they “don’t see 
why” they should read form terms, and 79.3% said they “strongly agree” or 
“somewhat agree” that it is “very important to read” purchase terms.193 
At the same time, 30.8% of respondents said that they “strongly agree” 
or “somewhat agree” with the statement that they “started reading terms 
after [they] had problems with consumer purchases,” while 18.8% selected 
“strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” with the statement that they “only 
read form terms after [they] have a problem” with a purchase.194  
Furthermore, there was a significant positive correlation between contract 
experience outside of one’s consumer role and disagreement with both of 
these statements, suggesting that those respondents with more contract 
experience were significantly more likely to read terms even if they had not 
experienced a purchase problem.195 
In addition, only 20.8% of respondents reported that they “frequently” 
or “nearly all the time” have “gone back to review terms [they] had 
previously read or skimmed because of a complaint or dispute” regarding a 
purchase.196  Of the rest, 33.2% said “sometimes” and 8.7% said “half the 
 
 189.  See infra app. G, at p. 347. 
 190.  See infra app. H, at p. 350; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6b. 
 191.  See infra app. H, at p. 350. 
 192.  See infra app. H, at p. 350; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6h. 
 193.  See infra app. H, at p. 351. 
 194.  See infra app. H, at p. 352; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6g. 
 195.  Again, using Kendall’s tau, we found a significant positive association at .105 between level 
of disagreement with the Part II, Question 6g statement and level of experience reported in Part IV, 
Question 2 (coded 0 to 4 for “very uncomfortable with contracts,” “know less than the average 
person,” “average,” “know more than the average person,” or “expert or specialist”).  Similarly, we 
found a Kendall’s tau association at .154 between level of disagreement with Part II, Question 6k 
and Part IV, Question 2, reported experience.  See Survey Notes, supra note 168.  This may suggest 
that those with more experience are more likely to read contracts regardless of whether or not they 
have complaints. 
 196.  See infra app. J, at p. 354.  The remainder of respondents stated “never” (5.4%), “rarely” 
(23.2%), or “n/a; never had a complaint or dispute” (8.7%).  See infra app. J, at p. 354. 
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time.”197  Furthermore, only 15.8% of respondents said “frequently” or 
“nearly all the time,” as compared with 40.6% reporting “never” or “rarely,” 
when asked how often they read contract terms “for the first time only after 
complaints or disputes arose” regarding a purchase.198 
These responses overall suggest that respondents generally do not look 
to contract terms in confronting purchase problems, and those who read 
contract terms at all generally do so regardless of complaints.199  This is 
especially true for respondents who reported greater contracting 
experience.200  Instead of focusing on contract terms to address purchase 
problems, consumers prefer to seek assistance through personal appeals and 
informal communications.201  They hope that companies will help them in 
order to preserve goodwill and prevent negative publicity.202 
That said, consumers also may ignore purchase terms because they are 
unaware of or do not understand the terms’ significance in a given situation.  
For example, all but five (1.6%) of the survey respondents said that they 
would want more explanation of at least some form contract terms when 
asked to “check all the terms that [they] would want the salesperson to 
explain” in a car purchase scenario.203  Respondents checked that they would 
want an explanation in the following percentages: terms requiring that they 
“resolve claims through a private means such as ‘arbitration’ instead of 
bringing claims to court” (55.9%),204 incentives (48.7%), general boilerplate 
(41.5%), technical/legal words (60.1%), price (72.5%), warranties (92.2%), 
fees/penalties (84%), returns (76.1%), and disclaimers (75.2%).205 
Respondents also indicated their focus on price and only a few key 
contract terms when asked how important they viewed various terms and 
factors in making consumer purchases.  Respondents stated “very important” 
 
 197.  See infra app. J, at p. 354. 
 198.  See infra app. I, at p. 353.  The remainder of respondents stated “sometimes” (22.1%), “half 
of the time” (12.4%), or “n/a; never had a complaint or dispute” (9.1%).  See infra app. I, at p. 353. 
 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 175–78. 
 200.  See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 201.  See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–56. 
 203.  See infra app. K, at p. 357. 
 204.  This accounted for 57.1% of female and 53.4% of male respondents.  See Memorandum 
from Heather Park, Research Assistant, to author (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with author) (documenting 
statistical accounting using SPSS); Survey Notes, supra note 168. 
 205.  See infra app. K, at pp. 354–57; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. III, question 3. 
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or “somewhat important” at the greatest rate for price (99.3%).206  They next 
indicated “very” or “somewhat important” as follows: non-price contract 
terms (86.5%), store reputation (84.1%), availability (81.9%), brand or label 
(71.4%), financing terms (78.5%), and friendly salesperson[s] (69.3%).207  
Furthermore, 64.8% of respondents indicated “very” or “somewhat 
important” with respect to family or friend recommendations and 67.1% 
indicated the same for “consumer reviews” in publications or on the 
Internet.208  This was higher than like indications for “personal relationship 
to seller” (40.6%), “gut feeling” (53.8%), and “just want it” (56.6%).209  
Accordingly, many consumers do consider shared information and may seek 
the advice of other informed consumers. 
Statistical analysis of survey responses also showed some association 
between respondents’ demographic information and their indications of 
importance with respect to reviews and recommendations in making 
purchases.210  Respondents with higher incomes were more likely to find 
consumer reviews important, perhaps suggesting greater access to reviews 
and purchase resources.211  There also was a significant correlation between 
a respondent’s gender and attribution of importance to friend or family 
recommendations, with 68.8% of female versus 56.9% of male respondents 
indicating “very” or “somewhat important” for these recommendations.212  
This may confirm theory and other data suggesting that women are more 
relational and family-focused than men in making purchases.213  In a sense, 
women may listen to “squeaky wheels” more often than men do when 
making purchase choices. 
Overall, the data suggested that consumers rely mainly on price and 
price-related factors in making purchases, and place relatively little 
 
 206.  See infra app. L, at pp. 359–62.  The survey listed specific contract terms and non-contract 
factors, and used “non-price” terms as a catchall for the general terms and conditions that were not 
otherwise parsed out in the list.  See Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. I, question 3. 
 207.  See infra app. L, at pp. 358–63. 
 208.  See infra app. L, at pp. 360–62. 
 209.  See infra app. L, at pp. 358, 360–62. 
 210.  See infra app. N, at pp. 364–65. 
 211.  See infra app. N, at pp. 364–65.  Using Kendall’s tau, we found a significant correlation of   
-.109 between reported income (coded in escalating order starting with 1 for less than $20,000) and 
an indication of importance (coded 1 to 4 for “very important,” “somewhat important,” “minor 
importance,” and “not important”).  See Analysis Backup, supra note 179. 
 212.  See infra app. O, at p. 366.  Female respondents were therefore significantly more likely to 
find these recommendations important per a Kendall’s tau of -.121 between gender (coded 1 for 
male and 2 for female) and an indication of importance (coded 1 to 4 for “very important,” 
“somewhat important,” “minor importance,” and “not important”).  See Analysis Backup, supra note 
179 
 213.  See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (noting how women tend to focus more on 
relationships than men do in their exchanges). 
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emphasis on contract terms that they often do not read or understand.214  
Furthermore, consumers may myopically focus on price and fail to consider 
the full panoply of information that would assist them in making wise 
buying decisions.215  They also may carry this myopia forward and fail to 
consult their contracts when problems arise.  Consumers therefore may 
forfeit contract rights that could assist their assertion of post-purchase 
complaints.216 
At the same time, consumers have voiced dissatisfaction with 
companies’ remedy mechanisms.  Consumers in my survey reported 
relatively negative perceptions of dispute settlements.217  This, in turn, may 
increase their skepticism and further hinder their impetus to pursue contract 
remedies.  Furthermore, this hesitance to assert claims may be even stronger 
for those with less economic or social power in the marketplace, especially 
when they fear repercussions of stereotypes and biases.218 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE SWS IN THE CONSUMER CONTEXT 
These business and consumer behaviors and attitudes converge to fuel 
the SWS’s interference with contract regulation and allowance for 
contractual discrimination to the detriment of the least informed and most 
vulnerable consumers.219  Merchants know that most consumers are 
uninformed regarding their rights, and may use the SWS to prevent the 
informed minority from alerting others about purchase problems and 
merchants’ practices.220  Merchants therefore may heed demands of the 
informed squeaky wheels with the resources to persistently pursue their 
rights, while continuing to impose onerous provisions and withhold benefits 
 
 214.  See infra app. L, at pp. 358–63 & app. H, at pp. 350–52. 
 215.  See infra app. L, at pp. 358–63 & app. H, at pp. 350–52. 
 216.  See infra app. J, at p. 354. 
 217.  See infra app. B, at p. 343 (only 32.7% of survey respondents indicated “completely fair” or 
“usually fair” with respect to settlements). 
 218.  As with any survey research, it is subject to interpretation differences as well as perception 
and other cognitive biases.  People read and interpret questions differently, regardless of how “clear” 
or sanitized the questions are.  Furthermore, people have a natural propensity to believe that their 
views are the “normal” views even when they are not.  See Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus 
Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1269, 1280–300 (2008) (explaining false 
consensus bias and how it applies in contract interpretation contexts). 
 219.  See infra Part III.A–C. 
 220.  See infra notes 302–10 and accompanying text. 
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for the silent masses.221  This thwarts market regulation and consumer 
protection, and creates an economically unhealthy consumer caste system.222 
A.  Silenced “Informed Minority” 
Law and economics proponents and other defenders of the market 
propose that freedom of contract results in optimal allocation of resources, 
assuming that rational consumers will buy the optimal quality and quantity 
of goods and services under competitive terms.223  Critics of this proposition 
argue that most consumers do not have perfect information, and do not read 
or understand the complicated terms commonly in form contracts.224  
Consumers therefore fail to purchase optimal quantities or bargain for 
competitive and efficient terms.225  This, in turn, leaves companies free to 
take advantage of consumers’ lack of information and bargaining power.226  
The market therefore fails to police the fairness or efficiency of consumer 
contracts.227 
Market defenders respond, however, that regardless of whether most 
consumers read or bargain for efficient terms, a sufficiently knowledgeable 
and noisy “informed minority” will police the fairness of merchants’ policies 
and practices.228  They propose that companies will cater their contracts to 
appease these consumers who read contracts and spread negative 
information about company practices, even if it means that the companies 
must offer favorable terms to all consumers.229  Accordingly, the informed 
minority of consumers will speak up for the uninformed masses to police 
merchants’ contract terms.230 
Empirical data nonetheless raises serious questions regarding existence 
of this “informed minority.”231  For example, researchers studied consumers’ 
Internet browsing behavior with respect to sixty-six online software 
companies’ websites to explore the veracity of the “informed minority” 
 
 221.  See infra notes 302–10 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See infra text accompanying notes 312–14. 
 223.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 3–28 (7th ed. 1992) 
(explaining the economic model and the usefulness of economic theory in analyzing law). 
 224.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 635–54 (explaining the various arguments). 
 225.  See id. at 639. 
 226.  Id. at 635–47 (setting forth arguments and critiques of economists’ assumptions). 
 227.  See id. at 671. 
 228.  See id. at 646–62; see also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 637–39 (discussing this 
theory). 
 229.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 646. 
 230.  Id. at 636 (explaining the economists’ argument “that if a sufficient number of consumers 
read and understand latent terms and thereby become informed, then they will demand efficient 
terms, and the producers will in turn provide those terms to all consumers”). 
 231.  See Bakos et al., supra note 15, at 36–37. 
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argument and the factors that lead consumers to access companies’ standard 
form contracts (referred to as end-user software license agreements, or 
“EULAs”).232  The researchers found that only one or two in one thousand 
shoppers accessed the studied software EULAs for at least one second.233  
Furthermore, they found that shoppers rarely accessed product reviews or 
other substitute information sources.234  This left researchers doubtful that an 
“informed minority” of Internet shoppers exists, let alone takes the time to 
bargain for fair or efficient terms or otherwise drive the content of software 
companies’ contracts.235 
Similarly, research suggests the unlikelihood that a sufficient number of 
proactive consumers will regulate merchant practices by spreading 
information and taking action ex post regarding purchase problems.236  One 
European study found that only 7% of consumer cases ended with a 
resolution in court or an alternative proceeding.237  The researchers also 
found that 45% of launched complaints ended with no agreement or 
decision, suggesting that consumers who took initial action on their 
complaints nonetheless gave up their pursuits along the way.238  Although 
some of these complaints may have lacked merit, this indicates that even 
initially proactive consumers run out of time and resources to pursue their 
claims. 
Meanwhile, there is plenty of evidence that most consumers remain inert 
and uninformed regarding their contract rights.239  This is not surprising in 
light of the high costs of obtaining information and pursing contract 
claims.240  In addition, advertising and disclosure laws generally fail to 
correct for imperfect information, especially when disclosures add to the 
information overload that already clouds consumers’ abilities and 
 
 232.  Id. at 15–17 (studying the browsing habits of 45,091 Internet users). 
 233.  Id. at 3. 
 234.  Id. at 33. 
 235.  Id. at 1–5.  The researchers nonetheless found that older and higher income consumers are 
more likely to access EULAs, and shoppers are more prone to access EULAs with respect to “free” 
or otherwise suspect products.  Id. at 10–26. 
 236.  See Loos, supra note 125, at 2–14 (discussing the need for reform to increase consumers’ 
private enforcement of European contract regulations). 
 237.  Id. at 4 (citing a Dutch survey). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  See, e.g., supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 240.  See Loos, supra note 125, at 3. 
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inclinations to read and understand their contracts.241  In a Consumer 
Reports survey, nearly two-thirds of respondents claimed that they read all 
of the disclosures regarding a new loan or credit card they obtained in the 
prior year, but only 16% of these readers said they found the disclosures 
understandable.242  It may take a consumer nearly three hours just to read the 
lengthy fine print that usually comes with a car purchase agreement.243 
Furthermore, businesses may boost these anti-information impacts by 
using especially complicated fine print in their form contracts and teaser 
promotions to “shroud,” or effectively hide, the true costs of contracts.244  
For example, lenders have used negative amortization loan structures and 
seemingly benign add-ons for credit insurance that are difficult, if not 
impossible, for even the most educated consumers to detect or understand.245  
Furthermore, such preprinted form terms have become so widespread that 
consumers no longer notice them or assume they must be valid.246  This 
perpetuates businesses’ abilities to profit from consumers’ myopia. 
Companies also may manipulate more formal complaint resolution 
processes due to consumers’ lack of awareness or experience using such 
processes.247  This allows merchants to keep claims out of the public eye and 
further limit their provision of remedies to relatively few proactive 
consumers.248  Merchants may then continue to impose onerous fees and 
one-sided terms on the uninformed majority.249  For example, it surfaced in 
congressional hearings that a credit card issuer that inexplicably raised all of 
its customers’ interest rates by two percent apologized and rescinded the rate 
 
 241.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 86–95, 113–26 (discussing the inability of disclosure 
laws to protect consumers from predatory lending, and proposing counseling to ease this lack of 
protection). 
 242.  Noreen Perrotta, No More Fine-Print Surprises, CONSUMER REP.: MONEY ADVISER, Feb. 
2011, at 2 (noting survey results). 
 243.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 96 (discussing a case in which the court noted that it took 
the consumer two hours and forty-five minutes to read the contract).  See also Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 1, 7–20, 40–55 (Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin 
Law & Econ. Working Paper, 2d Series, No. 516, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/516-obs-disclosure.pdf. 
 244.  See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 889–903 (discussing “shrouding”). 
 245.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 90–95 (explaining the various predatory practices 
that are difficult for consumers to understand or digest). 
 246.  See id. at 98–103 (discussing consumers’ lack of knowledge structure to properly assess 
terms and their propensity to thus accept terms without question); see also supra Part II.B.4 (noting 
how my survey findings confirm this sentiment). 
 247.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 710–17. 
 248.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 673–75.  “Cases abound where parties—informed 
consumers—have simply changed standard form contracts to suit their preferences.”  Id. at 674. 
 249.  See id. at 674–75. 
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increase for only the few customers who complained.250  “For everyone 
else—those who were not sophisticated enough to call—the increase 
stuck.”251 
The sophisticated consumers then have no reason to inform the masses 
about merchants’ practices or the availability of purchase assistance; instead, 
these consumers may be “complicit in the exploitation of the myopic 
because the welfare loss that is born by the myopic redounds to the benefit 
of the sophisticated.”252  Companies have more resources for assisting the 
sophisticated squeaky wheels when they continue to profit from imposing 
onerous terms on the consumer masses.253 
Furthermore, even if an informed minority exists, this minority may not 
typify or advocate for other consumers.254  Consumers have different buying 
and contracting needs, and may not be economically rational in the 
traditional sense.255  Moreover, even informed consumers that read contract 
terms may agree to onerous or ostensibly unfair terms for various personal 
reasons.256 
B.  Contractual Discrimination 
Psychological and social theories suggest that consumers acquiesce to a 
low-power status that leads them to accept poor treatment by merchants with 
superior economic and bargaining power.257  This is especially true in 
markets dominated by relatively few companies or involving limited supply 
 
 250.  Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) 
(discussing how companies appease only those who complain, while leaving the masses in the dark 
regarding their potential rights). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 890.  See also id. at 885–97 (discussing businesses’ 
willingness to make exceptions and provide waivers only for the consumers who seek waivers and 
exemptions). 
 253.  See id. 
 254.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 670–72 (highlighting how marginal consumers are not 
necessarily the average consumers, and how sellers differentiate among consumers). 
 255.  See generally Morris B. Holbrook & Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Experiential Aspects of 
Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 132 (1982) (discussing 
the many factors that affect buyer behavior and calling for more research of those considerations); 
William H. Redmond, Consumer Rationality and Consumer Sovereignty, 58 REV. SOC. ECON. 177 
(2000) (discussing how consumer choice is a prime example of suboptimal decision-making). 
 256.  See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That 
Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 738–50 (2008) (critiquing the informed minority argument 
and explaining how it is false to assume that an informed minority will result in efficient terms). 
 257.  Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 29–33 (2002). 
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goods or services.258  In addition, sellers may use their power to capitalize on 
consumers’ over-confidence regarding their purchases and failures to 
properly weigh and consider contract risks and information.259  Powerful 
lenders, for example, may impose one-sided terms on consumers who rely 
on these lenders for much needed credit.260  Stories of this power dynamic 
and consumers’ lack of protection pervade politics and our current consumer 
psyche.261 
Nonetheless, informed consumers have the potential to harness their 
power by inspiring collective action.262  This relies, however, on consumers 
taking action based on what they learn about companies’ faulty products and 
practices.  The SWS hinders this consumer empowerment by suppressing 
information sharing and consumers’ pursuit of contract claims.  This is 
especially true for consumers with low socioeconomic status or claims that 
involve personal judgment or low-cost items.263 
A consumer caste system thus develops, with the average uninformed 
consumer falling in the lower class.  “[T]he actual complaining customer” is 
a rarity,264 and consumers who are most vulnerable to feelings of 
powerlessness are least likely to complain.265  Research indicates that 
complainers have not only greater “consumer sophistication” in terms of 
knowledge and experience regarding their contract rights, but also higher 
incomes and educational resources than average consumers.266  These 
sophisticated consumers also have higher quality and service expectations, 
and less fear of humiliation from complaining.267  They generally are more 
confident, and thus enjoy more success, in seeking remedies when 
 
 258.  See Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 91–100 (2011) (discussing how cell phone companies use complexity to take 
advantage of the consumer); Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 49, 118 (2009) (noting how power plays a role in cellular service contracts “designed to 
exploit the cognitive biases of many consumers”). 
 259.  See Becher, supra note 89, at 136–78 (noting consumers’ failure to properly assess low-
probability risks, the likelihood of future incidents, and information buried in impenetrable forms). 
 260.  See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 93–96 (discussing power in the marketplace and the 
subtleties of power with respect to bargaining). 
 261.  See, e.g., id. 
 262.  See, e.g., id. (emphasizing how power can appear in unexpected ways). 
 263.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730. 
 264.  Speer, supra note 52, at 14. 
 265.  See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 95–98. 
 266.  See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 25–51 (2006) (discussing “consumer sophistication” and 
reviewing research literature regarding characteristics of consumers who complain about their 
purchases). 
 267.  Id. at 33–35. 
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dissatisfied with their purchases.268  This is especially true with respect to 
expensive purchases.269 
In contrast, consumers with lower socioeconomic status often become 
accustomed to poor treatment and have lower expectations regarding their 
purchases.270  They therefore are less likely to perceive purchase problems, 
let alone to complain to the company.271  One study suggested that a 
combination of reported perception and complaint rates showed that “for 
every 1,000 purchases, households in the highest status category voice 
complaints concerning 98.9 purchases, while households in the lowest status 
category voice complaints concerning 60.7 purchases.”272  Consumers in the 
lowest category likely have less confidence and fewer resources with which 
to assert their complaints.273  They also often lack financial education and 
may face hurdles created by limited English proficiency.274 
Income and education therefore play significant roles in determining 
consumers’ likelihood to complain and pursue their rights with respect to 
their purchases.275  Research also suggests that politically active consumers 
and those with high-status jobs are more likely to complain.276  Furthermore, 
most studies indicate that younger consumers are more likely to assert their 
contract rights.277  To be fair, research is mixed regarding demographic 
differences in complaint frequencies, and some studies indicate that the price 
of the purchase, the probability of winning the complaint, and the frequency 
of the purchase type overshadow demographics in predicting the likelihood 
of complaints.278  Nonetheless, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the 
 
 268.  See id. 
 269.  See id. at 34. 
 270.  Id. at 33. 
 271.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 727 (discussing the role of socioeconomic status in 
complaints). 
 272.  Id. at 723. 
 273.  See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33. 
 274.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-518, FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL 
LITERACY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 1, 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10518.pdf (reporting the extent to which limited English 
proficiency—along with income and education—impact financial education, and the ability to make 
informed judgments and take effective actions regarding contracts and money management). 
 275.  See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33–34 (gathering research). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  However, at least one study has suggested that consumers over fifty-five are more likely 
than consumers under thirty-five to seek contract changes or pursue complaints.  See Speer, supra 
note 52, at 13.  This may explain why a lack of understanding and facility to rectify adjustable rate 
mortgage issues has been most pervasive among young, low-income, and uneducated consumers.  
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SWS perpetuates a divide between the high-power “haves” and low-power 
“have-nots” based on income, education, and age.279 
In addition, the SWS further disadvantages minorities and women due to 
stereotypes and biases.280  As discussed above, customer representatives’ 
subconscious associations and biases may affect how they negotiate with 
consumers, and lead them to offer the worst deals to minorities and 
women.281  Representatives already prone to resist complaints as attacks on 
their self-esteem also may be especially resistant when the complaints come 
from individuals against whom they harbor conscious or subconscious 
negative associations.282 
At the same time, some consumers may perpetuate their low-power 
status by failing to assert their rights based on stereotypical assumptions.283  
Ex ante, some consumers may fear that seeking contract changes will 
backfire or “rock the boat,” and cause a seller to revoke an offer.284  For 
example, a consumer fearful of being labeled as economically weak or less 
worthy based on her gender, race, or residence in an impoverished 
neighborhood, is unlikely to question, negotiate, or even read credit card 
terms if she fears that the lender will then deny her an extension of credit.285 
Ex post, bias concerns also may influence consumers’ impetus to 
complain or seek redress.  Using female consumers as an example, women 
may refrain from complaining about their purchases or contracts due to fear 
that they will appear rude or inappropriately masculine.286  Furthermore, the 
 
See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 98–99 (noting research); see also Sharon Oster, The 
Determinants of Consumer Complaints, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 603, 605–06 (1980) (discussing a 
study linking complaint frequency with purchase type); Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33–35 (noting 
research regarding gender). 
 279.  See supra text accompanying notes 264–78. 
 280.  See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 237–40 (discussing contractual discrimination 
based not only on economics, but also on perceptions and attitudes based on factors such as race). 
 281.  See supra text accompanying notes 144–55 (discussing data regarding contractual 
discrimination based on race and gender). 
 282.  Plymire, supra note 69, at 61–62 (explaining the emotional components of complaint 
discussions). 
 283.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 108–10 (discussing how an employee’s statements at 
work may confirm or disconfirm stereotypes and the propensity for minority employees to refrain 
from complaining due to stereotype concerns); see also supra text accompanying notes 144–55 
(discussing the role of stereotypes in the SWS). 
 284.  See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 60–64 (1963) (explaining how “detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way of 
creating good exchange relationships between business units”); Loos, supra note 125, at 5–7 
(explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking departures from status quo contract 
terms). 
 285.  See supra text accompanying notes 156–66 (discussing Williams and contractual 
discrimination based on such status). 
 286.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 109–10 (providing the example of a female Latino 
employee in a white, male-dominated workplace who may be more cautious in criticizing 
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more concerned a consumer is about affirming negative labels, the greater 
the likelihood that she will feel constrained in her communications.287  This 
gives companies greater leeway in perpetuating the SWS to raise costs and 
risks for outsiders in seeking contract changes or other assistance.288 
That said, consumers also bear fault for not voicing their contract needs 
and complaints.289  Some consumers’ inertia may prevent them from taking 
initiative to assert their needs, while other consumers may be “biased” 
against companies to the extent that they assume that companies are 
heartless or will necessarily refuse to consider their complaints.290  
Consumers in the focus groups I held in Denver seemed to coalesce around 
this assumption after one consumer opined that with contract or purchase 
disputes, consumers feel: “Hey, I ain’t gonna win no matter what.  It’s just a 
matter of luck if I can get through this transaction and not get screwed.”291  
She voiced a presumption that there is no reason to ask companies for 
assistance since most consumers are “at middle and below.”292 
To some extent, it is fair for companies to reward those who take 
initiative to seek assistance and other benefits.293  However, stereotypes and 
biases can make it disproportionately difficult for some consumers to get 
desired results.294  Companies may use hasty assumption in deciding which 
squeaky wheels are worthy of assistance.295  As discussed, companies may 
differentiate among consumers based on income, job status, race, and 
gender, and offer different deals based on their biases, perceptions, and 
assumptions.296  They generally favor consumers they deem high-value, 
 
institutional policies due to a stereotype of female Latinos being hostile or less loyal than white male 
counterparts). 
 287.  See id. at 114–22, 133–39 (also explaining how “[o]utsiders who perceive there to be 
negative stereotypes of them are likely to lose out” in a SWS at work). 
 288.  Id. at 133–42 (further explaining how employers may exploit outsider vulnerabilities in a 
SWS). 
 289.  See supra text accompanying notes 87–103. 
 290.  See supra text accompanying notes 87–103. 
 291.  See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674–75 (discussing how companies engaged in this 
behavior benefit from cost savings). 
 294.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
 295.  See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 135 (discussing how sometimes, in the 
employer–employee context, employees may be too quick to label someone as a complainer whose 
comments do not deserve attention). 
 296.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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while ignoring the majority of consumers without resources to recognize or 
assert their complaints or needs.297 
Furthermore, stereotypes may cloud public perception of some 
consumers’ complaints.  For example, the public may quickly brush aside a 
female consumer’s blog post stated in emotive language.298  Contractual 
discrimination under the SWS thus deepens a divide between squeaky 
wheels with the power and resources to pursue their needs, and the majority 
of consumers, who subsidize rationed remedies provided to the high-value 
minority by quietly paying fees and enduring onerous terms.299 
C.  Under-Enforcement of Consumer Protections and Stifled Public Voice 
As noted above, an extremely small percentage of consumer complaints 
reach third parties, thereby allowing businesses to control complaint 
resolution and hinder both consumer remedies and education with respect to 
faulty goods and services.300  Public litigation and class actions serve 
important functions in enforcing public protections and giving voice to 
“little guys” who could never achieve redress through individual actions.301  
However, the SWS impedes these functions by quieting consumers with the 
resources to either lead class actions or otherwise initiate public mechanisms 
for enforcing consumer protections and other legal regulations. 
Some companies target squeaky wheels who threaten class actions with 
settlement offers in order to shut down such public proceedings.302  For 
example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,303 Gateway offered to waive a 
contractual thirty-day return limit and give the Hills a full refund in hopes of 
shutting down their attempt to lead a class action regarding Gateway 
computer problems.304  The case history evidences how the SWS allows 
 
 297.  See supra text accompanying notes 160–63. 
 298.  See supra text accompanying note 145.  Nonetheless, the public should ignore Internet 
complaint postings that are abusive or unfounded. 
 299.  See Horton, supra note 59, at 605–09 (2010) (noting how contract adherents have no reason 
to expend time and resources shopping for terms that companies may unilaterally change, while 
companies feel no pressure to change form procedural terms to suit adherents’ preferences). 
 300.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 728–29. 
 301.  See, e.g., Jeffrey I. Shinder, In Praise of Class Actions, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 5, 2010, at 39 
(discussing the importance of class actions to give voice to “little guy” consumers who have been 
wronged by credit card merchants). 
 302.  See Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action Cases: Do Defendants 
Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 283, 284 (2000) (discussing when settlement 
offers are made before filing of class certification motions to moot a named plaintiff’s claim); David 
Hill Koysza, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 
53 DUKE L.J. 781, 789 (2003) (addressing defendants’ use of settlement offers to preclude plaintiffs 
from leading class actions). 
 303.  105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 304.  See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 
707–09 (discussing the case and its exemplification of this dynamic). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:16 PM 
[Vol. 39: 279, 2012] Squeaky Wheel System 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
317 
companies to quiet public lawsuits, thereby hindering development of the 
law and leaving most consumers uninformed and perhaps without redress 
regarding product defects.305 
Similarly, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, the 
court used Green Tree’s post-hoc offer to pay the consumers’ costs of 
arbitration in justifying its enforcement of an arbitration clause in Green 
Tree’s form consumer contracts.306  In that case, the consumer sought to 
invalidate the arbitration clause in order to lead a class action alleging that 
Green Tree violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and other laws.307  The 
United States Supreme Court rejected the consumers’ arbitration clause 
challenge, however, finding that the consumer did not prove that she would 
not be able to vindicate her rights due to high arbitration costs.308  The Court 
seemed to rely on Green Tree’s offer during oral arguments to cover any 
unaffordable costs.309  This allowed the company to use the SWS, coupled 
with arbitration, to prevent a class action and public exposure that may have 
forced the company to change its contracts for the benefit of all 
consumers.310 
The SWS is therefore similar to arbitration and other private settlement 
processes in that it allows companies to privatize or internalize complaint 
resolution.311  It also hinders development of the law and limits public access 
to information regarding faulty products and company improprieties.312  The 
SWS also leaves parties without direction regarding future behavior.313 
 
 305.  Id. at 707 (also noting how the Hills may have been “less vocal victims of corporate avarice” 
or possibly “mendacious malcontents”). 
 306.  See 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 (2000); id. at 92–97 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 307.  The consumer claimed that she could not vindicate her statutory rights under the form clause 
that called for the parties to split arbitration costs, which could equal or exceed any damages she 
stood to collect on her small claim.  Id. at 90–91 & n.6 (majority opinion). 
 308.  Id. at 91–92. 
 309.  See id. at 93–95 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating how counsel 
for Green Tree merely “offered a hint” during oral arguments in the direction that it would pay the 
consumer’s arbitration costs, but there was “no reliable indication in [the] record that [the 
consumer’s] claim will be arbitrated under any consumer-protective fee arrangement”). 
 310.  See id.; see also Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1257–60 (W.D. Wash. 
2009) (highlighting the functions of class actions). 
 311.  See generally supra text accompanying notes 302–10. 
 312.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or 
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1093–97 (1999) (claiming that judicial adjudication, in contrast 
to arbitration, can stimulate legal development and create public values largely because courts 
communicate with each other and the public through recorded opinions). 
 313.  See id. at 1095–97 (noting how arbitration does not create precedent or speak to the public). 
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That is not to say that private settlements and arbitration agreements are 
necessarily bad.314  They can be beneficial when fairly and properly 
monitored and administered, especially in basic contract disputes or intra-
communal contexts in which parties share power and understandings.315  
Privatization of claims resolution can nonetheless be troubling with respect 
to discrimination, consumer protection, and other claims affecting public 
health or safety.316  Public proceedings and judicial opinions shed light on 
these issues and may spark further investigations and policy initiatives.317  
Courts are “equipped to expose manufacturers who manipulate and hide 
behind the law.”318 
For example, public action often is necessary to uncover product recall 
and complaint information.  Consumers generally must take initiative to 
register purchased products to receive notification of recalls, and must file 
Freedom of Information Requests to obtain information regarding product 
complaints.319  Consumer Reports found in its 2010 survey of 2,005 adults 
that only a fifth of the respondents were aware of recalls regarding products 
they had purchased in the past three years.320  Furthermore, less than a 
quarter of respondents said they researched product recalls, and nearly a 
third of those who learned of recalls took no action on the recalls.321  “[A]n 
additional 15 percent simply threw the product in the trash rather than 
returning it for a refund, an exchange, or a free repair.”322  Nonetheless, 
policymakers hope that a new Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) database, launched in March 2011, will address this lack of 
 
 314.  See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial 
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 299 
(1995) (discussing the benefits of arbitration to consumers, including speed and cost). 
 315.  See id. 
 316.  See id. at 318 (arguing that arbitration denies consumers statutory protections due to limited 
discovery, lack of class action procedures, and absence of written opinions).  But see Meredith W. 
Nissen, Class Action Arbitrations, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 19, 21 (explaining AAA 
class arbitration rules requiring that reasoned awards be made publicly available). 
 317.  See Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the Great Divide 
in Consumer Protection, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 219, 223–35 (2005) (emphasizing the uneven power 
structure in pharmaceutical cases and the need for civil litigation to protect consumer interests). 
 318.  Id. at 231.  For example, the courts played an important role in exposing the inadequacy of 
fabric flammability standards.  Id. at 231–34 (discussing how consumers had to prosecute court 
claims regarding flammable children’s clothing in the 1980s to make the public aware of 
flammability regulations’ inadequacies and companies’ manipulations of these regulations). 
 319.  Iffy Product? Now a Way to Tell, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2011, at 16, 16–17 [hereinafter Iffy 
Product] (highlighting the difficulties of obtaining information regarding complaints and companies’ 
power in blocking information); Trouble with Recalls, supra note 9, at 15 (advising consumers to 
register products to receive recall information). 
 320.  Trouble with Recalls, supra note 9, at 14 (also noting that recalls usually involve food or 
medications). 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Id. 
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enforcement by providing consumers and manufacturers with a central portal 
for reporting and learning about product problems.323 
IV.  NEW AVENUES FOR INFORMATION AND REMEDIES 
The confluence of these economic, behavioral, and social factors has 
allowed the SWS to limit consumer information and remedies regarding 
purchase problems.324  The SWS has elevated merchants’ private dispute 
resolution practices above the law in determining consumer complaints.325  
However, the Internet and computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
provide hope for consumers to break free from the barriers of the SWS, and 
may fuel policy initiatives for expanded consumer remedy mechanisms.326  
These mechanisms should be designed to increase consumer education 
regarding contract rights, and ease the costs and burdens of accessing 
remedies.327  They also should seek to address B2C power imbalances, and 
level the playing field for all consumers—regardless of wealth, education, 
race, or age.328  Specifically, policymakers should capitalize on the benefits 
of CMC to create and regulate Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) processes 
that are free or low-cost for consumers.329   
A.  Utility of Online Communications in the Digital Age 
The expansion of CMC and online mechanisms has had important 
influences in the SWS.  Digital dogma boasts the promise of the Internet, 
 
 323.  Iffy Product, supra note 319, at 16–17 (discussing the new database and other technology 
upgrades contemplated by the CPSC). 
 324.  See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 727–34. 
 325.  Id. at 730. 
 326.  See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution 
to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in 
Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2002) (discussing consumer use of the 
Internet to access information and utilize dispute resolution). 
 327.  See Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers 
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 240–43 (2010). 
 328.  Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730–31. 
 329.  See Schmitz, supra note 327 (discussing how online arbitration, what I term “OArb,” opens 
new avenues for consumers to obtain remedies on their contract complaints); see also Philippe 
Gilliéron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 301, 308–10 (2008) (noting use for consumer small claims); Haitham A. Haloush & 
Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Characteristics and Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 327, 327–29 (2008) (discussing how use of online ADR can foster efficient dispute 
resolution and maximize the growth of e-commerce in England and abroad). 
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wireless telephones, and continually emerging technologies.330  However, 
the growth of CMC also raises concerns regarding relational isolation, 
diminished creativity, and increased deception.331  CMC has inspired a new 
generation that communicates through text messages instead of telephone 
calls, and socializes through chat rooms, blogs, and networks like Facebook 
and Twitter.332  Handwritten letters and personal phone calls have become 
rarities.333  Nonetheless, the benefits of CMC outweigh its drawbacks for 
consumers seeking to make wise purchases and access remedies when 
problems arise. 
1.  Reservations Regarding Use of CMC 
CMC and e-contracting have created benefits and burdens for 
consumers.334  Companies have nearly eliminated face-to-face (F2F) 
customer assistance.  They often make it very difficult for consumers to 
locate merchant telephone contact numbers, let alone reach a live 
representative capable of handling one’s concerns.335  E-contracting also has 
allowed companies to shroud form terms in computer links and confusing 
website configurations, and to continually modify provisions ex post.336  
Many merchants routinely reserve the right to make post-contract changes to 
their standard e-contracts, and to post changes on their websites without 
sending alerts to those affected.337  Consumers visiting brick-and-mortar 
 
 330.  Schmitz, supra note 327, at 180. 
 331.  Nicole Gabrielle Kravec, Dogmas of Online Dispute Resolution, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 125 
(2009) (discussing “dogmas” of communication via the Internet in resolving disputes).  Like Kravec, 
I am using “dogma” in this context to refer to a “generally held set of formulated beliefs that a group 
holds to be true.”  Id. at 126. 
 332.  See Betsy Israel, The Overconnecteds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/education/edlife/connect.html?scp=1&sq=The+Overconnected
s&st=nyt. 
 333.  See id.  Please excuse the nostalgia, but this loss is significant from social and psychological 
perspectives. 
 334.  See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 
1169–81 (2010) (discussing the pros and cons of technology with respect to consumer contracting). 
 335.  See Sheri Carder & Larry Gunter, Can You Hear Me? Corporate America’s Communication 
with Dissatisfied Customers, J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES, Fall 2001, at 109, 110 (finding, in a study 
of consumer complaints, that many consumers are unable to receive adequate assistance through 
telephone calls). 
 336.  See Budnitz, supra note 334, at 1169–71 (highlighting e-contracting and dangers of using 
online contracts subject to modification). 
 337.  See id. (noting that while courts enforce such post-contract changes, there is debate as to the 
proper method of notice of the changes). 
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stores also find it very difficult, or impossible, to find staff at those stores 
with the authority to make contract changes or provide redress.338 
Companies also may use CMC in their rationing-by-hassle tactics to 
avoid consumers’ claims.339  Some companies ignore e-mails or send 
automated replies that lead consumers to give up pursuit of their 
complaints.340  While CMC usually is convenient, it also lacks the intimacy 
and social cues that enhance F2F interactions.341  This was why many of the 
consumers in my Denver focus groups voiced complaints with companies’ 
online communications, and concluded that they often prefer to discuss 
complaints and claims in person with a manager or other company 
representative.342  They also were unaware of companies with more formal 
online complaint mechanisms.343 
The anonymity of CMC also allows for “cyber bullying.”344  “It’s easier 
to fight online, because you feel more brave and in control.”345  CMC 
negotiators may become overly aggressive by adopting negative emotional 
styles due to the social and physical distance created through Internet 
communications.346  CMC may diminish empathy, which may hinder dispute 
 
 338.  However, consumers also reported great difficulties in attempting to contact company 
representatives by telephone or e-mail to negotiate terms or resolve complaints.  This was especially 
true when purchasing goods or services via the Internet.  See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61. 
 339.  See Lewis, supra note 4, at 100 (noting the use of hassle tactics to avoid claims). 
 340.  Carder & Gunter, supra note 335, at 110. 
 341.  See Kravec, supra note 331, at 125–30 (discussing and questioning social connections and 
contextual cues in online mediation). 
 342.  See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61. 
 343.  Id. 
 344.  Ann Epstein & Jeffrey Kazmierczak, Cyber Bullying: What Teachers, Social Workers, and 
Administrators Should Know, 3 ILL. CHILD WELFARE 41, 42 (2006–2007), available at 
http://www.illinoischildwelfare.org/archives/volume3/icw3-3.pdf. 
 345.  Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html?emc+etal&pagewanted=print (discussing 
“cyberbullying,” defined by the Cyberbullying Research Center as “‘willful and repeated harm’ 
inflicted through phones and computers”).  See also Epstein & Kazmierczak, supra note 344, at 41–
45 (citing cyber bullying incidents); Nancy S. Kim, Website Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 
2009 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1006–15 (discussing cyber harassment and cyber bullying); Parents: Cyber 
Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide, ABCNEWS.COM (Nov. 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/ 
story?id=3882520&page=1 (reporting a teenage suicide prompted by malicious Internet postings). 
 346.  See JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 60–63 (2010) (noting the anti-
human approach fostered by the expansion of Internet life); Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. 
Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer’s Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated Interviewing, 
Counseling, and Negotiating, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 115, 137–38 (2003) (discussing the allowance 
for negative or rude communications through CMC, and its relation to “flaming” biases). 
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resolution.347  Internet communications also are more vulnerable to 
misinterpretations than F2F discussions to the extent that speakers cannot 
immediately clarify their comments.348  Nonetheless, regular use and 
common acceptance has helped standardize many textual cues, and this trend 
is likely to continue with increasing use of CMC.349 
2.  Overriding Benefits of CMC for Accessing Remedies 
Despite these concerns regarding the growth of CMC, most agree that 
CMC’s benefits outweigh its drawbacks.  Online contracting fosters 
efficiencies that generate time and money savings for companies and 
consumers.350  Companies enjoy cost savings from standardization and 
inexpensive administration of online contracts and communications, and 
may pass these savings on to consumers through lower prices and higher 
quality goods and services.351  Consumers also enjoy the conveniences of 
managing accounts, paying bills, and communicating with companies online 
with relatively little cost or time.352  Many companies also are more 
responsive to requests and questions sent through e-mails or their own 
website’s chat or other message systems.353 
Moreover, CMC has lowered hurdles and broadened means for 
consumers to seek remedies on their purchase complaints.  The relative 
anonymity, privacy, and comfort of communicating from behind one’s 
computer or smartphone often alleviate some of the social and power 
pressures of F2F communications that otherwise hinder many from asserting 
their complaints.354  Visual contact alone creates stress and tensions for 
 
 347.  Matt Richtell, Attached to Technology and Paying a Price, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/technology/07brain.html?src+me&ref=technology. 
 348.  See LANIER, supra note 346, at 60–63 (discussing dehumanizing impacts of the Internet). 
 349.  See Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 346, at 118–26 (detailing the trends of increased use of 
CMC in lawyering). 
 350.  See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form 
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 
309–10 (2008) (noting ways that online standard form contracts save money for vendors and 
increase consumer confidence). 
 351.  See id. at 310. 
 352.  See Judy Strauss & Donna J. Hill, Consumer Complaints by E-mail: An Exploratory 
Investigation of Corporate Responses and Customer Reactions, 15 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 63, 
64 (2001) (noting how customers increasingly send companies e-mails for a number of reasons). 
 353.  See id. at 65 (indicating that responses to e-mails are quicker than responses to postal mail 
correspondence). 
 354.  See Paul Stylianou, Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty Between the United 
States and the European Union in Resolving Cross-Border E-Commerce Disputes, 36 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 117, 125 (2008) (recognizing that F2F communications can result in “negative 
emotion”). 
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some, especially if they fear stereotypes or biases based on appearance.355  
Despite reports of cyber bullying, many are actually less defensive or 
adversarial online than in-person.356  In addition, CMC has become less 
sterile over time, as individuals have developed means for virtually building 
rapport with others and expressing their emotions over the Internet.357 
The Internet also has opened avenues for consumers to share 
information about their purchase experiences.358  This has given rise to 
online watchdog websites such as the Utility Consumers Action Network 
(UCAN).  UCAN provides an online forum for consumers to alert others 
regarding contract dangers and to offer suggestions for avoiding or 
responding to consumer issues.359  Furthermore, the Internet opens doors for 
consumers to research their purchases.360  Some individuals also are more 
cautious in composing e-mails because they know that it has become very 
difficult to completely erase or retract them.361 
 
 355.  Id. at 125–26 (noting how online dispute resolution allows parties to focus on the substantive 
issues, although this lack of F2F contact also has its drawbacks for facilitative processes). 
 356.  See David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson, Technology Mediated Dispute 
Resolution Can Improve the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf Ethical Practices System: The Deaf 
Community Is Well Prepared and Can Lead by Example, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 131, 141 
(2008) (explaining evidence that less bullying occurs through online communication than F2F). 
 357.  Id. at 140–41 (noting how “[t]echnology can protect parties from uncomfortable or 
threatening face to face confrontations and offer vulnerable individuals a place where their 
communications can appear as forceful as the statements of someone who is physically much larger 
and louder,” although it also creates risks for cyber bullying). 
 358.  See Budnitz, supra note 314, at 1180–81 (noting how technology can enhance consumer 
protection by providing portals for consumers to share information regarding companies and 
products). 
 359.  See UCAN, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (describing itself as a “non-
profit, public interest consumer advocacy” group focusing on energy, communications, and water, 
and providing a complaint forum along with additional resources); see also Mike Scott, Cell Phone 
Companies Changing Contract Terms, THE FINE PRINT: UCAN’S CONSUMER WATCHDOG BLOG 
(Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.ucan.org/blog/telecommunications/wireless/contract_change/ 
cell_phone_companies_changing_contract_terms (alerting others of changes in contracts that many 
would not catch); Vince, Cancel Your Sprint/Nextel Contract Without an Early Termination Fee, 
Telecommunications, UCAN (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.ucan.org/telecommunications/wireless/ 
cancel_your_sprint_nextel_contract_without_early_termination_fee (providing advice on how to 
avoid cancellation charges). 
 360.  See Gibbons, supra note 326, at 3 (discussing how the Internet is used by consumers to 
research prices).  Although some individuals are not sufficiently careful in communicating online, 
there is some evidence that a growing number of online users are becoming more cautious in light of 
privacy and other concerns.  Susan C. Herring, Computer-Mediated Communication on the Internet, 
36 ANN. REV. INFO. SCI. & TECH. 109, 144–45 (Blaise Cronin ed., 2002) (noting how Internet users 
are becoming more careful in their online communications due to concerns about privacy threats). 
 361.  See Herring, supra note 360, at 145. 
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CMC also has given rise to more formalized ODR.  ODR generally has 
included online mediation, arbitration, and other dispute resolution processes 
that minimize or dispel the need for F2F communications by utilizing 
website message systems, e-mails, and other CMC platforms.362  These ODR 
processes can be relatively inexpensive, and allow for flexible scheduling, 
asynchronous communication, and real-time dialogue.363  They also may be 
faster and less intrusive than in-person dispute resolution processes.364  
Furthermore, many predict that ODR will grow in coming years due to its 
ability to transcend borders and escape the constraints of other legal 
processes less suited for resolution of e-commerce and international 
disputes.365 
Nonetheless, the limited ODR processes currently offered for consumer 
claims are usually non-binding, only applicable if the consumer agrees to 
use the merchant’s own ODR process, and rarely used due to companies’ 
failures to notify consumers about their ODR rights.  For example, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
administers a non-final ODR process under the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Procedures (UDRP) that parties may use in resolving domain name disputes 
if they agree in advance to use the process.366   
The social networking website Facebook also has implemented an ODR 
mechanism through TRUSTe for resolution of consumers’ privacy 
 
 362.  Am. Bar Ass’n’s Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alt. Dispute Resolution, Addressing 
Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 BUS. LAW. 415, 419 
(2002) [hereinafter ABA 2002 Report] (broadly defining ODR). 
 363.  See Gilliéron, supra note 329, at 328–34 (explaining how use of ODR provides beneficial 
and efficient avenues for communication that may transcend benefits of the F2F environment in 
traditional ADR). 
 364.  This prompted the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 2000 public workshop and 2001 
roundtable discussions exploring expanded use of ODR for resolution of consumer disputes 
regarding online transactions.  Public Workshop: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer 
Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, 65 Fed. Reg. 7831 (Feb. 16, 2000); Public 
Roundtable on Dispute Resolution for Online Business-to-Consumer Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 7491 
(Jan. 23, 2001).  It appears from the FTC website and other research that little has happened since 
these events. 
 365.  See, e.g., Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, More More More: CPR Meeting 
Highlights, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 125, 127–28 (2009) (highlighting technology 
and ODR as key elements in the future of dispute resolution). 
 366.  Jason M. Osborn, Note, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: 
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 214 (2000).  The UDRP was 
adopted on August 26, 1999, and the implementation documents were approved on October 24, 
1999.  Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last modified Aug. 13, 
2010); Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN): Rules for Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 39 I.L.M. 952 (2000); WIPO Arbitration Rules, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2012). 
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disputes.367  Under the applicable rules, Facebook must comply with 
TRUSTe determinations regarding misuse of personally identifiable 
information or violations of privacy.  The problem is that consumers are 
generally unaware of their rights to use the TRUSTe process.368  This is 
because such rights are buried in the labyrinth of terms and conditions 
posted among the links on Facebook.369  Furthermore, consumers are 
generally unaware that the BBB also tracks complaints against Facebook.370 
B.  Suggestions for Expanding and Equalizing Consumer Assistance 
The time is ripe for commentators and policymakers to consider how the 
SWS fosters contractual discrimination and corrosion of “informed 
minority” market regulation, and to design complaint mechanisms that help 
expand and equalize consumers’ access to remedies.371  Policymakers should 
capitalize on the benefits of CMC to craft complaint mechanisms and ODR 
processes that are transparent, user-friendly, and worth their costs in light of 
the complexity and possible payout on the claims at issue.372  In addition, 
processes should be sufficiently simple for consumers to use without the 
need for legal assistance, and should allow consumers to obtain neutral 
claim evaluations and enforceable remedies.373 
 
 367.  See John Gamble, Facebook & TRUSTe, TRUSTE BLOG (May 12, 2010), 
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/05/12/facebook-truste/ (noting Facebook and TRUSTe’s business 
relationship since 2006); see also File a Privacy Complaint, TRUSTE, http://watchdog.truste.com/ 
pvr.php?page=complaint (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); Privacy Program Requirements, TRUSTE, 
http://www.truste.com/privacy-program-requirements/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); Watchdog Dispute 
Resolution Process, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/why_TRUSTe_privacy_services/online-
privacy-watchdog (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). 
 368.  See Watchdog Dispute Resolution Process, supra note 367 (further explaining the TRUSTe 
process).  Notably however, the process strictly limits eligible claims and allowable remedies, and 
gives TRUSTe great discretion in applying these limits.  Id. 
 369.  See Memorandum from Heather Park, Research Assistant, to author (May 25, 2010) (on file 
with author) (documenting and reporting an informal poll of users indicating that they did not know 
about the eTrust online process for resolving privacy disputes against Facebook).  Admittedly, this 
was not a scientific or thorough survey, but it nonetheless shed light on common Facebook users’ 
awareness regarding this ODR process.  See also E-mail from David Horton to author, supra note 
116 (recounting one law professor’s struggle to get out of a contract after overlooking click-wrap on 
a “free” service); Memorandum from Nathan Vassar to author, supra note 115 (reciting one law 
student’s battle with a company after failing to read e-contract terms). 
 370.  See BBB Business Review—Facebook, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://sanjose.bbb.org/ 
Business-Report/Facebook-223670 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
 371.  See supra text accompanying notes 160–63. 
 372.  Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO L. 
REV. 305, 308–16 (2010). 
 373.  See id. at 309–18 (noting what works and does not work in dispute resolution mechanisms). 
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With this in mind, the first step should be to raise awareness regarding 
available remedies.  Individuals gain confidence to pursue their rights and 
are more proactive in economic choices when they learn what others ask for 
and obtain with respect to similar complaints.374  Industry and consumer 
groups such as the BBB already compile and post general statistics regarding 
complaints that consumers file with the BBB, but should also post 
information regarding companies’ provision of price and fee reductions to 
consumers upon request.  For example, the BBB could require companies 
seeking its approval to submit reports stating average fee and price 
reductions they provide to consumers who ask.  Membership fees could 
cover the relatively low cost of compiling and adding this information to 
BBB postings.  The database could resemble the aforementioned CPSC 
database for product safety complaints that launched in 2011.375 
Independent and industry groups should also work together to educate 
consumers about existing complaint resolution mechanisms.  For example, 
the BBB facilitates mechanisms for resolving consumers’ complaints against 
automobile dealers, cellular phone companies, and most other B2C 
merchants.376  These mechanisms help consumers gain companies’ attention 
on their claims, and often lead to dispute settlements.  These processes are 
non-binding unless the parties agree that the result will be final, but 
companies’ reputational concerns often prompt them to provide remedies on 
claims that the BBB determines valid and supported by adequate 
information to be worthy of response.  Furthermore, these processes help 
consumers structure their complaints and communications with 
companies.377  This can be especially useful for consumers who otherwise 
lack the education or experience to assert complaints on their own.378 
 
 374.  See Wang, supra note 126, at 1309–11 (proposing that employees gain access to information 
regarding others’ salaries to address gender differences in negotiations and to help women obtain 
equal pay); Penelope Wang, 7 Secrets to a Richer Retirement, CNN MONEY (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/21/retirement/richer_retirement.moneymag/index.htm (noting how 
individuals may increase their saving for retirement when aware of what others are saving). 
 375.  See supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting the database launched in March 2011); 
see also CPSC’s Product Safety Information Database, SAFER PRODUCTS, 
http://www.saferproducts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (CPSC database launched on March 11, 
2011 for reporting harmful products). 
 376.  The BBB has been active in handling consumers’ escalating complaints against cellular 
phone companies.  See US BBB 2009 Statistics Sorted by Complaint, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, 
http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/16/documents/stats%20pdf/us_complaint.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 
2012); US BBB 2008 Statistics Sorted by Complaints, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/ 
us/storage/16/documents/stats%20pdf/us_by_complaint_2008_inter.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2012); 
US BBBs Sorted by Complaint 2007, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/0/ 
shared%20documents/complaintstats/stat2007/us_by_complaint_2007.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). 
 377.  Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 657–59 (noting research suggesting that 
constraints on communication modes may reduce gender bias). 
 378.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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It is no surprise that the BBB has used ODR processes.  As noted above, 
the Internet has opened new avenues for consumers to share purchase and 
product information, and to assert complaints through ODR mechanisms 
such as that administered through TRUSTe.379  When properly regulated to 
ensure impartiality and fair procedures, such mechanisms may ease cost, 
time, and bias concerns inherent in F2F dispute resolution.380  Online 
processes may also dispel the stresses of seeking assistance by providing a 
structured, text-based means for communicating needs.381  They also may 
give companies more accurate feedback and better information regarding 
their practices and products.382 
In addition, expanded use of ODR that provides a binding award (online 
arbitration, or what I term “OArb”) may be especially effective for quick 
resolution of consumer claims.383  While ODR that facilitates voluntary 
agreements is laudable, it often is unsuccessful in the wake of disputes.  By 
requiring parties to commit to submitting disputes to binding arbitration, 
OArb prevents parties from allowing anger or delay tactics to waylay 
resolution and thus access to remedies.  OArb also may be more satisfactory 
and productive than non-binding processes because parties participate 
knowing that it will end in a final determination.384 
Nonetheless, OArb commitment must be voluntary and properly 
regulated to ensure fairness.385  F2F arbitration has earned a poor reputation 
for curbing consumer and employee rights due to pro-business procedures 
 
 379.  See supra text accompanying notes 367–68. 
 380.  Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 659 (noting studies showing that CMC eases 
communication bias by reducing social cues and subconscious propensities present in F2F 
communications). 
 381.  See Jelle van Veenen, From :-( to :-): Using Online Communication to Improve Dispute 
Resolution 1–20 (Tilburg Inst. for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law & Conflict Resolution Sys., 
Working Paper No. 002/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1618719 (noting how 
online communications can improve dispute resolution). 
 382.  See supra notes 362–70 and accompanying text (noting the benefits of ODR). 
 383.  OArb differs from other ODR because it results in a final third-party determination without 
the cost and stress of traditional litigation.  See Schmitz, supra note 327 (proposing expansion of 
OArb). 
 384.  See id. at 193. 
 385.  See David J. Bilinsky, 10 Collaborative Principles for Leading a Successful ODR System 
Initiative, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/ 
2010/09/01/10-collaborative-principles-for-leading-a-successful-odr-system-initiative (guest post by 
Ben Ziegler) (providing tips for increasing confidence in e-commerce through ODR systems); David 
J. Bilinsky, Implementation Consideration for ODR, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/2010/08/02/implementation-considerations-for-odr 
(discussing best practices for ODR); Schmitz, supra note 327, at 235–40 (discussing fairness limits 
and safety measures for OArb). 
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and administration.386  Although it is questionable whether F2F arbitration 
deserves this reputation, it is important to design and regulate neutral and 
fair OArb procedures that will foster open-minded use of the process.387 
Accordingly, policymakers should capitalize on CMC’s low cost, speed, 
and accessibility.388  OArb policies should cap consumers’ costs and set 
strict time limits for companies to respond to complaints.  Policies also 
should allow for sufficient but properly limited discovery, and limit time on 
evidentiary submissions and awards.  Furthermore, arbitrators must be 
neutral and properly trained, and have power to hold companies responsible 
for failing to quickly comply with arbitration awards.  Regulators should 
then seek user feedback in order to foster continual system improvements.389 
OArb regulations also could mimic California’s code provisions 
requiring arbitration administrators to gather and post basic information 
regarding consumer claims in an easily searchable format.390  This 
information includes the names of companies involved, types of disputes, 
prevailing parties, time from filing to disposition, claim and award amounts, 
arbitrators’ names, and other basic information not properly redacted as 
confidential.391  Such postings help increase trust and transparency with 
respect to the process, and uncover party and award patterns that would 
suggest an arbitration administrator’s bias for repeat-player companies who 
continually use its services.392 
At the same time, policymakers should promote neutral and user-
friendly means for consumers to safely “vent” and share information 
 
 386.  See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867–68 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
that a class action ban in an arbitration agreement was unconscionable where it was likely to 
preclude most consumers from seeking remedies on their small claims). 
 387.  See Schmitz, supra note 327, at 226–44 (proposing regulated ODR for consumer complaint 
resolution). 
 388.  See supra text accompanying notes 367–68. 
 389.  See Schmitz, supra note 327, at 226–44; see also Xu Junke, Development of ODR in China, 
42 UCC L.J. 265, 265–72 (2010) (discussing ODR in China and the need for increased online trust 
and consumer confidence to boost ODR processes and encourage “self-discipline” of e-commerce); 
Colin Rule et al., Designing a Global Consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-
Border Small Value-High Volume Claims—OAS Developments, 42 UCC L.J. 221 (2010), available 
at http://colinrule.com/writing/ucclj.pdf (discussing how to create a global system for resolving 
consumer disputes and highlighting the United States’ proposal for an ODR system).  Full discussion 
of ODR and OArb and means for expanding them in a measured manner is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but further discussion may be found in Schmitz, supra note 327, at 177–244 (proposing 
prudent expansion). 
 390.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2011). 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Further research and policy discussions should nonetheless guide OArb’s development.  See 
Rule et al., supra note 389, at 222–30.  Debates on ODR have grown on global levels, and hold great 
promise for consumer claims resolution.  See ODR 2012, http://www.odr2012.org/node?page=1 (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2012) (announcing the most recent ODR conference). 
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regarding their purchase complaints.393  Consumers already  connect, share 
opinions, and spread information regarding company practices and products 
on websites such as UCAN, noted above.394  The new CPSC database, also 
noted above, is part of a larger technology upgrade aimed to provide 
consumers and others with greater access to complaint information.395  The 
New York Times and other news sources also maintain online columns for 
voicing consumer complaints and seeking assistance.396 
Consumers have power to prompt corporate changes.  For example, 
Facebook retracted onerous changes to its privacy standards after users 
joined forces on the Internet to complain.397  Similarly, Musikpitch, a 
company that facilitates custom song commissions for television and 
movies, changed its terms in the wake of users’ complaints about the terms’ 
requirement that songwriters transfer ownership of their songs to the 
company.398  Musikpitch ultimately appeased users by no longer assuming 
ownership of song rights, and instead allowing users to choose between one 
of three sets of terms and conditions.399 
Nonetheless, policy initiatives may be necessary to combat cyber 
bullying, dehumanization, and anti-normative behavior on the Internet.400  
Organizations that host blogs and review websites should monitor postings 
to preclude abusive or false comments.401 Furthermore, regulations should 
 
 393.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 394.  See UCAN, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2011); see also supra note 359 and 
accompanying text (discussing postings and advice on UCAN’s website). 
 395.  See Iffy Product, supra note 319, at 16–17 (discussing the database that debuted on March 
11, 2011, pursuant to a law passed in 2008). 
 396.  See, e.g., David Segal, Scammed? Rebuffed? Ignored? Read On, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/05/10/your-money/10haggler.html (regular column, The Haggler); 
David Segal, The Refund That Circled Before Landing, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2009), 
http://nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09haggler.html (regular column, The Haggler, noting the 
first anniversary of the column, and responding to consumers’ submitted questions and complaints). 
 397.  Justin Smith, Facebook Reverts Terms of Service After Complaints, INSIDE FACEBOOK, (Feb. 
18, 2009), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/02/18/facebook-reverts-terms-of-service-after-
complaints (explaining how consumer protests forced Facebook to ultimately revert to its old terms 
while it rewrote more consumer-friendly privacy terms). 
 398.  Bruce Houghton, MusikPitch Responds to Complaints, Revises Terms, HYPEBOT.COM, 
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2010/05/musikpitch-responds-to-complaints-revises-terms.html 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012). 
 399.  See id. 
 400.  See van Veenen, supra note 381, at 20–23 (discussing how online communications may 
actually heighten adherence to social norms, reduce the stress of F2F communication, and allow for 
emotive communications). 
 401.  Charles Starmer-Smith, Tripadvisor Reviews: Can We Trust Them?, TELEGRAPH (London) 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/hotels/8050127/Tripadvisor-reviews-can-we-
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bar companies from disingenuously promoting their products and services 
by paying for positive reviews or posting fake reviews (“flogging”) on blogs 
and review sites.402 
Website controllers and administrators must adopt policies aimed to 
protect the integrity and utility of website discussions.  Information-sharing 
mechanisms do not enhance consumer education or inform purchase 
practices when postings are not trustworthy.  Website controllers should be 
responsible for verifying that reviewers have actually purchased the 
reviewed goods or services, and allow businesses to respond to 
complaints.403  Although controls should not overly infringe on free speech, 
they should curtail the tone of comments from crossing the line to abuse.  
Policymakers should also establish means for certifying sites that consumers 
can rely on for solid purchasing advice. 
Still, efforts should continue toward development of remedies for those 
who lack Internet services due to location or other resource limitations.  
Non-Internet media should remain available to provide consumer 
information and access to remedies.  Local news channels already do 
“special investigations” that inform consumers about company improprieties 
and prompt policy changes.  For example, a local news channel’s special 
investigation inspired a Colorado tanning salon to provide relief to 
consumers who felt cheated by fine print in the salon’s terms that precluded 
customers from canceling without paying fifty percent of the remaining 
balance on their one or two year contracts.404  The television report became 
the squeaky wheel for the otherwise myopic majority, and allowed 
consumers to obtain relief from shrouded contract terms. 
In sum, these are merely reform ideas to build on.  Furthermore, reforms 
should increase consumers’ awareness and remedy resources without 
increasing litigation or government oversight that will augment public and 
private costs.  For example, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) established under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) should be careful in establishing 
 
trust-them.html (discussing fake and spiteful reviews that severely impact businesses, despite the 
reviews’ lack of verification). 
 402.  Lisa Thomas & Robert Newman, Social Networking and Blogging: The New Legal Frontier, 
9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 500, 516–17 (2009) (providing examples of companies 
faking reviews); Mark Balnaves & James Mahoney, Editorial, The Illusion of Control in Public 
Relations, PUB. REL. RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.prismjournal.org/global.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2011) (also discussing companies covert schemes); Starmer-Smith, supra note 401 (discussing 
purchase reviews posted on the popular travel review site). 
 403.  Starmer-Smith, supra note 401 (discussing the importance of proper monitoring and noting 
how eBay and Apple have had success in limiting reviews to those of verified customers). 
 404.  Heidi Hemmat, Complaints Prompt Changes ‘At the Beach,’ KDVR, FOX 31 DENVER (Dec. 
17, 2009), http://www.kdvr.com/news/kdvr-at-the-beach-folo-121709,0,4746023.story (describing 
how a Fox 31 News investigation caused the salon to offer a “courtesy cancellation” to the customer 
who complained). 
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consumer protections aimed to end lending abuses.405  The Bureau may be 
wise to promulgate regulations that promote use of low-cost CMC to 
establish and inform consumers about accessible complaint-processing 
mechanisms with respect to the goods and services they sell.   
Transparent and accessible remedy mechanisms are essential to prevent 
the SWS from perpetuating contractual discrimination and remedy rationing 
that thrives in low-information environments.  However, this does not 
require complicated disclosures that lead to information overload.  Instead, 
companies could provide customers with a simple chart stating who to 
contact regarding complaints, and how the complaint processing works.  In 
addition, the CFPB or an independent organization comprised of consumer 
and industry leaders could gather and centrally post this information with 
respect to all companies on a searchable website.406  This central listing 
could dovetail with the database proposed above for compiling legitimate 
complaints asserted against companies and the remedies provided.  Such 
transparency should spark companies to improve their complaint handling 
processes, and help empower consumers to pursue legitimate complaints and 
protect their rights regardless of status. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Consumers should benefit from exerting resources to pursue their 
purchase complaints, and companies often have benign motives in assisting 
the squeaky wheel customers.  However, the SWS also impedes market 
regulation of business practices and fosters contractual discrimination.407  
The SWS allows companies to ration consumer remedies and benefits by 
quietly reserving them for only the relatively few proactive consumers who 
 
 405.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  See also Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed bill to establish an agency 
to regulate consumer financial products and services and authorizing the agency to approve pilot 
programs for effective disclosure of consumer contract terms); Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).  But 
see David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 
2009 Would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, BLOOMBERG L. 
REP.: RISK & COMPLIANCE, Oct. 2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491117 (critiquing the Dodd-Frank Act for advocating broad applications 
without an adequate evidentiary basis). 
 406.  A full discussion of the options is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Article 
seeks to spark discussion and creative ideas for educating and empowering consumers in the most 
efficient and effective manner—which may be through public or private means. 
 407.  See supra Part III.A. 
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have the requisite knowledge and resources to remain persistent in pursuing 
their rights.408  This leaves the majority without benefits they may deserve.  
It also hinders the informed squeaky wheels from sharing their knowledge, 
and thus the available benefits, with the majority.409  These proactive 
consumers therefore fail to fulfill the role of the so-called informed minority, 
who economists propose will spread information and police contract 
fairness.410 
Accordingly, policymakers should work with businesses and consumers 
to expand and equalize consumers’ access to information and assistance with 
respect to their purchase rights.411  This should begin with use of low-cost 
online mechanisms to raise awareness regarding contract rights and 
remedies, and to create accessible claims procedures designed to diffuse the 
SWS.  Furthermore, companies should expand ODR and OArb for 
consumers to obtain redress on their legitimate purchase complaints.  In 
addition, the CFPB or an independent organization could assist in these 
efforts with an aim toward empowering consumers to protect their rights 
regardless of race, gender, or socioeconomic status. 
 
 408.  See supra Part III.A. 
 409.  See supra Part II.A. 
 410.  See supra Part II.A. 
 411.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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Appendix A.  Demographic Information. 
Age 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
18–24 yrs. old 19 6.2 6.2 6.2 
25–29 yrs. old 16 5.2 5.2 11.4 
30–39 yrs. old 40 13.1 13.1 24.5 
40–49 yrs. old 73 23.9 23.9 48.4 
50–59 yrs. old 81 26.5 26.5 74.8 
60–69 yrs. old 54 17.6 17.6 92.5 
70 yrs. or over 23 7.5 7.5 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Household Income 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
less than $20,000 43 14.1 17.1 17.1 
$20,000–$29,999 33 10.8 13.1 30.3 
$30,000–$39,999 43 14.1 17.1 47.4 
$40,000–$49,999 32 10.5 12.7 60.2 
$50,000–$59,999 22 7.2 8.8 68.9 
$60,000–$74,999 26 8.5 10.4 79.3 
$75,000–$99,999 24 7.8 9.6 88.8 
$100,000–
$149,999 23 7.5 9.2 98 
$150,000+ 5 1.6 2 100 
Total 251 82 100  
Missing System 55 18   
Total 306 100   
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Marital Status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
single, never married 58 19 19 19 
married 150 49 49 68 
separated/divorced/ 
widowed 75 24.5 24.5 92.5 
domestic partnership 23 7.5 7.5 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Employment Status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
full-time 129 42.2 42.2 42.2 
part-time 49 16 16 58.2 
not employed 128 41.8 41.8 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Education Level 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
some HS 5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
HS graduate 34 11.1 11.1 12.7 
some college 135 44.1 44.1 56.9 
college degree 78 25.5 25.5 82.4 
some postgrad 17 5.6 5.6 87.9 
master’s degree 27 8.8 8.8 96.7 
Ph.D./law/prof. 
degree 10 3.3 3.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Respondent Occupation 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
exec./upper mgmt. 12 3.9 4.5 4.5 
IT/MIS professional 11 3.6 4.1 8.6 
doctor/surgeon 2 0.7 0.7 9.4 
educator 11 3.6 4.1 13.5 
homemaker 33 10.8 12.4 25.8 
student 13 4.2 4.9 30.7 
none of above 168 54.9 62.9 93.6 
small business owner 17 5.6 6.4 100 
Total 267 87.3 100  
Missing System 39 12.7   
Total 306 100   
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Racial/Ethnic Identification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
unspecified 45 14.7 14.7 14.7 
other 6 2 2 16.7 
Hispanic 6 2 2 18.6 
multi: Hispanic/other 2 0.7 0.7 19.3 
Pacific Islander 2 0.7 0.7 19.9 
Indian 2 0.7 0.7 20.6 
multi: Hispanic/Indian 1 0.3 0.3 20.9 
Asian 3 1 1 21.9 
black 2 0.7 0.7 22.5 
white 228 74.5 74.5 97.1 
multi: white/other 1 0.3 0.3 97.4 
multi: white/Hispanic 4 1.3 1.3 98.7 
multi: 
white/Pacific/Hispanic 1 0.3 0.3 99 
multi: white/Indian 2 0.7 0.7 99.7 
multi: 
white/Indian/Hispanic 1 0.3 0.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
male 103 33.7 33.7 33.7 
female 203 66.3 66.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Appendix B.  S2Q8: Think broadly about how fair (using your own sense of 
“fairness”) you view different contracts and purchase terms, regardless of 
whether you have relevant personal experiences.  Please indicate how fair you 
view the following terms. 
Gym Memberships 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 12 3.9 4 4 
usually fair 80 26.1 26.9 31 
neutral 118 38.6 39.7 70.7 
usually unfair 74 24.2 24.9 95.6 
completely unfair 13 4.2 4.4 100 
Total 297 97.1 100  
Missing System 9 2.9   
Total 306 100   
 
Company Standard Form Contracts/Purchase Terms 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 8 2.6 2.7 2.7 
usually fair 164 53.6 55.2 57.9 
neutral 102 33.3 34.3 92.3 
usually unfair 20 6.5 6.7 99 
completely unfair 3 1 1 100 
Total 297 97.1 100  
Missing System 9 2.9   
Total 306 100   
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Employment Contracts and Handbooks 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 34 11.1 11.4 11.4 
usually fair 170 55.6 57 68.5 
neutral 73 23.9 24.5 93 
usually unfair 14 4.6 4.7 97.7 
completely unfair 7 2.3 2.3 100 
Total 298 97.4 100  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 306 100   
 
Loan Contracts 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1 
usually fair 132 43.1 44.4 52.5 
neutral 86 28.1 29 81.5 
usually unfair 46 15 15.5 97 
completely unfair 9 2.9 3 100 
Total 297 97.1 100  
Missing System 9 2.9   
Total 306 100   
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Apartment Leases 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4 
usually fair 134 43.8 45 51.3 
neutral 94 30.7 31.5 82.9 
usually unfair 41 13.4 13.8 96.6 
completely unfair 10 3.3 3.4 100 
Total 298 97.4 100  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 306 100   
 
Vehicle Sales Contracts 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4 
usually fair 152 49.7 51 57.4 
neutral 80 26.1 26.8 84.2 
usually unfair 35 11.4 11.7 96 
completely unfair 12 3.9 4 100 
Total 298 97.4 100  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 306 100   
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Credit Card Contracts or Terms 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 18 5.9 6.1 6.1 
usually fair 98 32 33 39.1 
neutral 78 25.5 26.3 65.3 
usually unfair 84 27.5 28.3 93.6 
completely unfair 19 6.2 6.4 100 
Total 297 97.1 100  
Missing System 9 2.9   
Total 306 100   
 
Internet Contracts/Purchase Terms 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 12 3.9 4.1 4.1 
usually fair 120 39.2 40.5 44.6 
neutral 139 45.4 47 91.6 
usually unfair 19 6.2 6.4 98 
completely unfair 6 2 2 100 
Total 296 96.7 100  
Missing System 10 3.3   
Total 306 100   
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Warranties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1 
usually fair 160 52.3 53.9 62 
neutral 73 23.9 24.6 86.5 
usually unfair 37 12.1 12.5 99 
completely unfair 3 1 1 100 
Total 297 97.1 100  
Missing System 9 2.9   
Total 306 100   
 
Cell Phone Contracts 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 16 5.2 5.4 5.4 
usually fair 94 30.7 31.8 37.2 
neutral 83 27.1 28 65.2 
usually unfair 83 27.1 28 93.2 
completely unfair 20 6.5 6.8 100 
Total 296 96.7 100  
Missing System 10 3.3   
Total 306 100   
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Contracts with Friends 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 26 8.5 8.8 8.8 
usually fair 92 30.1 31.2 40 
neutral 151 49.3 51.2 91.2 
usually unfair 15 4.9 5.1 96.3 
completely unfair 11 3.6 3.7 100 
Total 295 96.4 100  
Missing System 11 3.6   
Total 306 100   
 
Contracts with Family 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 34 11.1 11.6 11.6 
usually fair 87 28.4 29.6 41.2 
neutral 146 47.7 49.7 90.8 
usually unfair 18 5.9 6.1 96.9 
completely unfair 9 2.9 3.1 100 
Total 294 96.1 100  
Missing System 12 3.9   
Total 306 100   
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Dispute or Claim Settlement Agreements 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
completely fair 17 5.6 5.8 5.8 
usually fair 79 25.8 26.9 32.7 
neutral 131 42.8 44.6 77.2 
usually unfair 60 19.6 20.4 97.6 
completely unfair 7 2.3 2.4 100 
Total 294 96.1 100  
Missing System 12 3.9   
Total 306 100   
 
 
Appendix C.  S3Q6: Now think generally about any complaints or disputes you 
have had regarding consumer purchases of products or services.  What, if any, 
terms have you found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint 
or dispute?  Check all that apply. 
Price 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 245 80.1 80.1 80.1 
yes 61 19.9 19.9 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Warranties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 132 43.1 43.1 43.1 
yes 174 56.9 56.9 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Fees/Penalties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 192 62.7 62.7 62.7 
yes 114 37.3 37.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Interest Rate for Credit Payments 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 240 78.4 78.4 78.4 
yes 66 21.6 21.6 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Returning Items 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 153 50 50 50 
yes 153 50 50 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Cancelling Services 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 163 53.3 53.3 53.3 
yes 143 46.7 46.7 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Arbitration Requirements 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 271 88.6 88.6 88.6 
yes 35 11.4 11.4 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Freebies/Incentives 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 279 91.2 91.2 91.2 
yes 27 8.8 8.8 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Disclaimers/Waivers of Liability 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 252 82.4 82.4 82.4 
yes 54 17.6 17.6 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Other (yes/no) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 299 97.7 97.7 97.7 
yes 7 2.3 2.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Appendix D.  S3Q1: Now focus again on your consumer purchases and the form 
contracts or purchase terms you encounter when buying consumer products and 
services.  Roughly, how often do you try to negotiate or change such form 
contracts or terms when you purchase consumer products or services? 
How Often You Change Contracts or Terms 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
 
never 115 37.6 38 38 
rarely 83 27.1 27.4 65.3 
sometimes 65 21.2 21.5 86.8 
half the time 14 4.6 4.6 91.4 
frequently 19 6.2 6.3 97.7 
nearly all the 
time 7 2.3 2.3 100 
Total 303 99 100  
Missing System 3 1   
Total 306 100   
 
 
Appendix E.  S3Q1: Cross-tabulated with Gender. 
How Often You Change Contracts or Terms x Gender  
 never rarely sometimes 
half 
the 
time 
frequently 
nearly 
all the 
time 
 
Gender 
male 26 28 31 6 7 3 101 
female 89 55 34 8 12 4 202 
Total 115 83 65 14 19 7 303 
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Appendix F.  S3Q1A: If you have tried to change form terms, roughly how often 
have you been able to get the terms changed when you tried? 
How Often You Successfully Change Terms 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
never 24 7.8 13.2 13.2 
rarely 54 17.6 29.7 42.9 
sometimes 53 17.3 29.1 72 
half the time 22 7.2 12.1 84.1 
frequently 22 7.2 12.1 96.2 
nearly all the 
time 7 2.3 3.8 100 
Total 182 59.5 100  
Missing System 124 40.5   
Total 306 100   
 
 
Appendix G.  S3Q1B: What types of terms have you been able to get changed in 
form contracts?  Check all that apply: 
Price 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 195 63.7 63.7 63.7 
yes 111 36.3 36.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Warranties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 265 86.6 86.6 86.6 
yes 41 13.4 13.4 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Fees/Penalties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 245 80.1 80.1 80.1 
yes 61 19.9 19.9 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Interest Rate for Credit Payments 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 260 85 85 85 
yes 46 15 15 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Terms for Returning 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 266 86.9 86.9 86.9 
yes 40 13.1 13.1 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Terms for Cancelling Services 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 274 89.5 89.5 89.5 
yes 32 10.5 10.5 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Terms for Arbitration Claims 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 299 97.7 97.7 97.7 
yes 7 2.3 2.3 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Terms for Incentives 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 270 88.2 88.2 88.2 
yes 36 11.8 11.8 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Disclaimers/Waivers of Liability 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 289 94.4 94.4 94.4 
yes 17 5.6 5.6 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Appendix H.  S2Q6: Now think generally about purchase terms that sellers 
provide in a standard form.  Again, as described at the start of Part II, these 
form terms may be provided at a store, in the mail, in or on product packaging, 
or on the seller’s Web site on the Internet.  With this in mind, indicate your level 
of agreement with the following statements about such form terms. 
Assume Cannot Change 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 88 28.8 28.9 28.9 
somewhat 
agree 114 37.3 37.4 66.2 
neutral 57 18.6 18.7 84.9 
somewhat 
disagree 32 10.5 10.5 95.4 
strongly 
disagree 14 4.6 4.6 100 
Total 305 99.7 100  
Missing System 1 0.3   
Total 306 100   
 
Waste of Time to Read 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
somewhat 
agree 22 7.2 7.2 8.6 
neutral 62 20.3 20.4 28.9 
somewhat 
disagree 82 26.8 27 55.9 
strongly 
disagree 134 43.8 44.1 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
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Very Important to Read 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 139 45.4 45.7 45.7 
somewhat 
agree 102 33.3 33.6 79.3 
neutral 50 16.3 16.4 95.7 
somewhat 
disagree 9 2.9 3 98.7 
strongly 
disagree 4 1.3 1.3 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
 
Don’t See Why I Should Read 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 3 1 1 1 
somewhat 
agree 17 5.6 5.6 6.6 
neutral 58 19 19.1 25.7 
somewhat 
disagree 89 29.1 29.3 54.9 
strongly 
disagree 137 44.8 45.1 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
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Read Since Having a Purchase Problem 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 15 4.9 4.9 4.9 
somewhat 
agree 79 25.8 25.9 30.8 
neutral 79 25.8 25.9 56.7 
somewhat 
disagree 79 25.8 25.9 82.6 
strongly 
disagree 53 17.3 17.4 100 
Total 305 99.7 100  
Missing System 1 0.3   
Total 306 100   
 
Only Read After a Problem With That Purchase 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
strongly 
agree 8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
somewhat 
agree 49 16 16.1 18.8 
neutral 54 17.6 17.8 36.5 
somewhat 
disagree 86 28.1 28.3 64.8 
strongly 
disagree 107 35 35.2 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
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Appendix I.  S3Q4: Now think broadly about your purchases generally.  How 
often have you read contract or purchase terms covering a consumer product or 
service for the first time only after complaints or disputes arose about the 
product or service? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
never 34 11.1 11.4 11.4 
rarely 87 28.4 29.2 40.6 
sometimes 66 21.6 22.1 62.8 
half the time 37 12.1 12.4 75.2 
frequently 25 8.2 8.4 83.6 
nearly all the 
time 22 7.2 7.4 90.9 
n/a; never had 
a complaint or 
dispute 
27 8.8 9.1 100 
Total 298 97.4 100  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 306 100   
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Appendix J.  S3Q5: How often have you gone back to review terms you had 
previously read or skimmed because of a complaint or dispute? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
never 16 5.2 5.4 5.4 
rarely 69 22.5 23.2 28.5 
sometimes 99 32.4 33.2 61.7 
half the time 26 8.5 8.7 70.5 
frequently 46 15 15.4 85.9 
nearly all the 
time 16 5.2 5.4 91.3 
n/a; never had 
a complaint or 
dispute 
26 8.5 8.7 100 
Total 298 97.4 100  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 306 100   
 
 
Appendix K.  S3Q3: Imagine that you are shopping for a car and have found the 
one you think you want.  The salesperson gives you a five page contract with 
purchase terms, and asks you to sign it in order to finalize the purchase.  Please 
review the list of purchase terms below, and check all the terms that you would 
want the salesperson to explain to you. 
Explain Price 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 84 27.5 27.5 27.5 
yes 222 72.5 72.5 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Explain Warranties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 24 7.8 7.8 7.8 
yes 282 92.2 92.2 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Fees/Penalties 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 49 16 16 16 
yes 257 84 84 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Interest Rate for Payments 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 76 24.8 24.8 24.8 
yes 230 75.2 75.2 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Terms for Return 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 73 23.9 23.9 23.9 
yes 233 76.1 76.1 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Explain Arbitration Requirements 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 135 44.1 44.1 44.1 
yes 171 55.9 55.9 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Freebies/Incentives 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 157 51.3 51.3 51.3 
yes 149 48.7 48.7 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Disclaimers/Liability Waivers 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 76 24.8 24.8 24.8 
yes 230 75.2 75.2 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Boilerplate 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 179 58.5 58.5 58.5 
yes 127 41.5 41.5 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Explain Technical/Legal Words 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 122 39.9 39.9 39.9 
yes 184 60.1 60.1 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
Explain Other (yes/no) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 300 98 98 98 
yes 6 2 2 100 
Total 306 100 100  
 
No Terms Explained 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 301 98.4 98.4 98.4 
yes 5 1.6 1.6 100 
Total 306 100 100  
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Appendix L.  S1Q3: When you do “shop around” or compare choices, what 
leads you to make final purchasing decisions?  Think about the factors below, 
and indicate how important each of the factors generally is to you in deciding 
what to buy. 
Personal Relationship to Seller 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 35 11.4 11.6 11.6 
somewhat 
important 88 28.8 29 40.6 
minor 
importance 114 37.3 37.6 78.2 
not important 66 21.6 21.8 100 
Total 303 99 100  
Missing System 3 1   
Total 306 100   
 
Brand/Label 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 43 14.1 14.1 14.1 
somewhat 
important 174 56.9 57.2 71.4 
minor 
importance 65 21.2 21.4 92.8 
not important 22 7.2 7.2 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
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Store Reputation 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 101 33 33.4 33.4 
somewhat 
important 153 50 50.7 84.1 
minor 
importance 41 13.4 13.6 97.7 
not important 7 2.3 2.3 100 
Total 302 98.7 100  
Missing System 4 1.3   
Total 306 100   
 
Financing Options/Interest Rates 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 161 52.6 53.3 53.3 
somewhat 
important 76 24.8 25.2 78.5 
minor 
importance 29 9.5 9.6 88.1 
not important 36 11.8 11.9 100 
Total 302 98.7 100  
Missing System 4 1.3   
Total 306 100   
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Contract Terms/Conditions Other Than Price 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 164 53.6 53.9 53.9 
somewhat 
important 99 32.4 32.6 86.5 
minor 
importance 26 8.5 8.6 95.1 
not important 15 4.9 4.9 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
 
Just Want It 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 48 15.7 15.9 15.9 
somewhat 
important 123 40.2 40.7 56.6 
minor 
importance 100 32.7 33.1 89.7 
not important 31 10.1 10.3 100 
Total 302 98.7 100  
Missing System 4 1.3   
Total 306 100   
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Friend/Family Recommendations 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 43 14.1 14.1 14.1 
somewhat 
important 154 50.3 50.7 64.8 
minor 
importance 87 28.4 28.6 93.4 
not important 20 6.5 6.6 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
 
Consumer Reviews 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 66 21.6 21.7 21.7 
somewhat 
important 138 45.1 45.4 67.1 
minor 
importance 83 27.1 27.3 94.4 
not important 17 5.6 5.6 100 
Total 304 99.3 100  
Missing System 2 0.7   
Total 306 100   
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Gut Feeling 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 39 12.7 12.9 12.9 
somewhat 
important 124 40.5 40.9 53.8 
minor 
importance 98 32 32.3 86.1 
not important 42 13.7 13.9 100 
Total 303 99 100  
Missing System 3 1   
Total 306 100   
 
Price 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 236 77.1 77.9 77.9 
somewhat 
important 65 21.2 21.5 99.3 
minor 
importance 2 0.7 0.7 100 
Total 303 99 100  
Missing System 3 1   
Total 306 100   
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Friendly Salesperson 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
very important 61 19.9 20.1 20.1 
somewhat 
important 149 48.7 49.2 69.3 
minor 
importance 79 25.8 26.1 95.4 
not important 14 4.6 4.6 100 
Total 303 99 100  
Missing System 3 1   
Total 306 100   
 
Appendix M.  S3Q7: Had you seen or noticed anything about “arbitration” in 
any consumer purchase contract or terms? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
no 151 49.3 50.5 50.5 
yes 148 48.4 49.5 100 
Total 299 97.7 100  
Missing System 7 2.3   
Total 306 100   
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Appendix O.  S1Q3H: How important one views friend/family recommendations 
cross-tabulated with gender.
Gender
male female
Total
Count 11 32 43
% within S1Q3H 
purchase factors: 
friend/family
recommendation
25.60% 74.40% 100.00%
% within Gender 10.80% 15.80% 14.10%
very
important
% of Total 3.60% 10.50% 14.10%
Count 47 107 154
% within S1Q3H 
purchase factors: 
friend/family
recommendation
30.50% 69.50% 100.00%
% within Gender 46.10% 53.00% 50.70%
somewhat
important
% of Total 15.50% 35.20% 50.70%
Count 34 53 87
% within S1Q3H 
purchase factors: 
friend/family
recommendation
39.10% 60.90% 100.00%
% within Gender 33.30% 26.20% 28.60%
minor
importance
% of Total 11.20% 17.40% 28.60%
Count 10 10 20
% within S1Q3H 
purchase factors: 
friend/family
recommendation
50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
% within Gender 9.80% 5.00% 6.60%
S1Q3H
purchase
factors:
friend/family
recommen-
dation
not
important
% of Total 3.30% 3.30% 6.60%
Count 102 202 304
% within S1Q3H 
purchase factors: 
friend/family
recommendation
33.60% 66.40% 100.00%
% within Gender 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
% of Total 33.60% 66.40% 100.00%
